THE U.S. GROUND COMBAT PRESENCE IN KOREA: IN DEFENSE OF U.S. INTERESTS OR A STRATEGIC DINOSAUR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

KELVIN C. MARSHMENT, MAJ, USA
B.S., Ohio University, 1972
M.S., Cleveland State University, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A138 289
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The U.S. Ground Combat Presence in Korea: In Defense of U.S. Interests or a Strategic Dinosaur	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis
	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Major Kelvin C. Marshment	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS HQ, TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D Fort Monroe, VA. 23651	12. REPORT DATE 9 May 1983
	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 117
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

See reverse.

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

84 02 16 072

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

This study attempts to determine if the U.S. ground combat presence in South Korea serves the best interests of the United States. The investigation is focused on the balance of power between North and South Korea, and the effect which U.S. ground combat forces have on that balance. The study then discusses U.S. interests in Northeast Asia in an attempt to determine whether the U.S. ground combat presence and its effect upon the Korean Peninsula's balance of power do in fact further U.S. regional interests.

The thesis is introduced by a capsule history of the Korean Peninsula demonstrating the strategic importance of the peninsula and providing a background to U.S. involvement in Korea. In this context, the importance of the peninsula to Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union is explored as it relates to U.S. interests.

The analysis reveals a delicate balance of power between the two Koreas. The U.S. ground combat forces are found to provide a deterrent effect which other U.S. forces or aid are unable to provide. In terms of U.S. interests, the ground combat force demonstrates U.S. commitment to regional allies and plays a vital role in countering the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia. U.S. commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea results in a continuing ability to monitor and if necessary control Soviet naval activities in and around Soviet eastern ports.

The thesis further concludes that the necessity of a U.S. ground combat presence in South Korea will be dictated by regional events rather than a specific timetable. Until some mechanism, be it international pressure or an internal leadership change, changes the current hard line North Korean stance, a U.S. ground combat presence will be required.

THE U.S. GROUND COMBAT PRESENCE IN KOREA: IN DEFENSE OF U.S. INTERESTS OR A STRATEGIC DINOSAUR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

KELVIN C. MARSHMENT, MAJ, USA
B.S., Ohio University, 1972
M.S., Cleveland State University, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate Major Kelvin C. Marshment

Title of thesis The U.S. Ground Combat Presence in Korea: In Defense of U.S. Interests or a Strategic Dinosaur

Approved by:

LTC James F. Hufstetler, M.A., Thesis Committee Chairman

LTC James V. Young, M.A., Member, Graduate Faculty

CPT Jonathan M. House, Ph.D., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 31st day of May 1983 by Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

RE: Classified References, Distribution Unlimited
No change per Ms. Harre, ACGSC/Directory of Graduate Degree Program

ABSTRACT

THE U.S. GROUND COMBAT PRESENCE IN KOREA: IN DEFENSE OF U.S. INTERESTS OR A STRATEGIC DINOSAUR, by Major Kelvin C. Marshment, USA, 117 pages.

This study attempts to determine if the U.S. ground combat presence in South Korea serves the best interests of the United States. The investigation is focused on the balance of power between North and South Korea, and the effect which U.S. ground combat forces have on that balance. The study then discusses U.S. interests in Northeast Asia in an attempt to determine whether the U.S. ground combat presence and its effect upon the Korean Peninsula's balance of power do in fact further U.S. regional interests.

The thesis is introduced by a capsule history of the Korean Peninsula demonstrating the strategic importance of the peninsula and providing a background to U.S. involvement in Korea. In this context, the importance of the peninsula to Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union is explored as it relates to U.S. interests.

The analysis reveals a delicate balance of power between the two Koreas. The U.S. ground combat forces are found to provide a deterrent effect which other U.S. forces or aid are unable to provide. In terms of U.S. interests, the ground combat force demonstrates U.S. commitment to regional allies and plays a vital role in countering the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia. U.S. commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea results in a continuing ability to monitor and if necessary control Soviet naval activities in and around Soviet eastern ports.

The thesis further concludes that the necessity of a U.S. ground combat presence in South Korea will be dictated by regional events rather than a specific timetable. Until some mechanism, be it international pressure or an internal leadership change, changes the current hard line North Korean stance, a U.S. ground combat presence will be required.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to those who made this thesis possible.

To my thesis committee chairman, Lieutenant Colonel James F. Hufstetler, whose professional advice, encouragement, and expertise contributed immeasurably to completion of this study.

To my graduate faculty advisor, Lieutenant Colonel James V. Young, whose subject matter expertise was crucial to an accurate analysis of the problem.

To my consulting faculty advisor, Captain Jonathan M. House, Ph.D., for his advice and vital editing.

Finally and most importantly, to my wife Ki Sun for her sacrifices, understanding, and encouragement that allowed the final completion of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF MAPS


Korean Peninsula
Railroad
Expressway
Road
100 Miles
100 Kilometers
China
U.S.S.R.
North
Korea
P'YŎNGYANG
Demarcation Line
South
Korea
SEOUL
Japan
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

DG3011 7-76

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Korean history may be defined as defense against a succession of aggressive neighbors or as having the peninsula serve as a battleground between two or more of its powerful neighbors. Periodic internal strife within Korea further weakened a country which has continuously faced much stronger neighbors.

Historically, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union have been the principal nations with which the Koreans have had to deal in one manner or another. They encroached on Korean soil as a step to further conquest, to exploit labor and natural resources, or, in the case of Russia, in search of warm water ports. That the Koreans endured over time as a nation and a unique cultural group of people deserves special note.

The Korean Peninsula occupies a position of strategic importance in Northeast Asia. It dominates north-south shipping along the Asian coast between Japan and the peninsula. The peninsula was alternately used by the Chinese and Japanese as an invasion stepping stone to the Japanese Islands or the Asian mainland, respectively. Russia coveted the peninsula for its natural resources and its warm water ports.

The great powers surrounding Korea, fearing domination of the peninsula by their rivals, have continually reacted against each other. The division of the peninsula following World War II, and the inability

of the surrounding powers plus the United States to effect a reunification of the country, are reflections of the mistrust between these powerful nations and their belief that domination of the peninsula by another power would confer a significant advantage on the nation controlling the peninsula. The situation today finds North Korea and South Korea in an uneasy truce facing each other across a four kilometer wide demilitarized zone from a war that has never officially ended. Both Japan and the United States have national interests involved in having a friendly nation present on the peninsula, as do China and the Soviet Union. With these two separate power groups supporting South and North Korea respectively, a standoff has resulted for 30 years.

The end of the Second World War placed the United States squarely in the position of a global power. The growth of military technology, communications technology, and international economic interdependence has resulted in a necessity for the United States to maintain a very visible international position in pursuit of its national objectives and in defense of its vital interests.[1] This visibility has included diplomatic leadership, economic assistance, military equipment assistance, and provision of United States military assistance forces.

In the Pacific Theater, the close of World War II found the United States, jointly with the Soviet Union, accepting surrender of Japanese forces on the Korean Peninsula. This arrangement resulted in the division of the peninsula to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese. Tensions resulting from this division and the failure of reunification efforts have resulted in a continuous American presence on the peninsula since World War II.

The presence of American troops in the Republic of Korea, a part of the post World War II American global posture and strategy since 1945, has taken various forms but has been invariably aimed at the containment of Communism.

Purpose

Both the United States and the Soviet Union, concerned about their influence in the post-war Pacific area, were concerned with maintaining the right to participate in post-war decisions which would affect their respective interests. This concern led to the agreement to divide the peninsula to accept the Japanese surrender.

Following the Japanese surrender, the U.S. and Soviet Union were unable to agree on reunification methods. This resulted in two Korean governments being formed, each claiming a legitimate right to govern the entire peninsula.

The withdrawal of the majority of American troops in 1949, coupled with diplomatic activity that the North Koreans may have interpreted as demonstrating a lack of American will to defend South Korea, led to a North Korean attack in an attempt to unify the country and the Korean War. One of the specific diplomatic indications which led the North Koreans to misinterpret U.S. national will was former Secretary of State Acheson's speech to the National Press Club on January 21, 1950, where Korea was excluded from the stated U.S. defense perimeter.[2] However, American assistance under the banner of the United Nations did assist South Korea.

Since the Korean War U.S. administrations have considered an American military presence a necessary deterrent to North Korean aggression. This thesis is being written to specifically determine whether a necessity exists to maintain United States Army ground combat forces in the Republic of Korea.

It is impossible to discuss the issue of American ground combat forces without reviewing other aspects of United States foreign policy in the Northeast Asian arena. Specific limitations and methodology will be discussed later in this chapter. In addition a more specific discussion of how and why the United States became involved in Korea will be presented in Chapter 2.

Hypothesis

The principal hypothesis which this thesis will examine is that withdrawal of American ground combat forces from the Republic of Korea, under the current regional environment, would result in an unstable condition on the Korean Peninsula which would be contrary to U.S. vital interests. This unstable condition might specifically create an unacceptable risk of potential hostilities between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and in addition could significantly weaken U.S. vital interests in countering a worldwide Soviet threat. The risk will be analyzed in terms of the damage to U.S. interests in the region that hostilities between North and South Korea could cause.

Three subhypotheses will be examined in support of the main hypothesis. These are:

1. That hostilities in Korea would undermine the overall stability of Northeast Asia and endanger the status quo in a manner detrimental to U.S. national interests. (Note: The methodology section of this chapter will define Northeast Asia specifically).

2. That the American presence in the Republic of Korea, of which ground combat forces are an integral part, promotes stability in Northeast Asia and serves to deter hostilities between North and South Korea.

3. That stability or maintenance of the status quo in Northeast Asia is in the vital interests of the United States. The U.S. vital interests in this region will be discussed specifically in Chapter Four.

Assumptions

1. That the objectives and interests of the United States, Chapter Four, remain the same. Any change in national goals, objectives, or interests would require a reexamination of the findings of this thesis as those findings pertain to a change in national direction.

2. That the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, (North Korea), maintains current military strength levels, political ideology, and economic condition. The current level must be used as a thesis assumption; however, apparent trends, other possibilities, and their effects will be discussed. In addition, possible impacts of policies and actions by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and Japan on the hypothesis objective will be briefly reviewed.

3. That the national objectives and interests of the Republic of Korea remain the same; including a desire for the United States to maintain ground combat troops in South Korea. The Republic of Korea's desire for a U.S. ground combat presence is an obvious prerequisite to examination of the principal hypothesis.

Methodology

This thesis is prepared using available literature as the primary research instrument. The research and the thesis are unclassified. The use of interviews with subject matter experts and allies present at the United States Army Command and General Staff College has been made as the opportunity presented itself.

Discussion of the issues in this thesis involves the use of certain names and terms which must be defined to facilitate understanding the paper. These are presented below:

1. The Republic of Korea is referred to as South Korea or the ROK.
2. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is referred to as North Korea or DPRK.
3. Northeast Asia, as defined in this thesis, includes South Korea, North Korea, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. While this thesis specifically addresses the need for U.S. ground forces in South Korea based on the North Korean threat to South Korea and a comparison of power between North and South Korea, mention of the impact of the Korean problem on Northeast Asia is unavoidable. While

the hypothesis allows discussion of the overall effects of the Korean problem on Northeast Asia, this discussion may raise as many questions as it answers. Unanswered questions and regional uncertainties are pointed out as necessary issues for future research.

The thesis begins with a capsule look at the history of Korea followed by a more detailed examination of events since World War II. The real work of the thesis is found in the examination of the current situation on the peninsula as it relates to U.S. interests and options. This examination forms the basis for conclusions concerning the thesis hypothesis.

Thesis Organization

This thesis is organized to provide an understanding of the problem through an historical introduction, a comparison of power between North and South Korea, a discussion of U.S. interests and options, and a conclusion concerning the hypothesis.

Chapter One introduces the purpose of the thesis and the hypothesis, examines methodology and organization, and presents an historical background to the formation of the Korean nation and the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula. The historical background gives the reader an understanding of the evolution of the Korean people from their entry into the peninsula through World War II, and their relations with the remainder of Northeast Asia. The information provided in Chapter One facilitates understanding of why the Korean Peninsula is

such a strife torn region. This background information ends in World War II. Of necessity it is a brief overview of an extended period of time.

Chapter Two examines the period from 1945 to the present. Significant events which have led to the current situation on the peninsula are presented and briefly discussed. This discussion specifically focuses on Korean history as it directly relates to the current U.S. presence on the peninsula. However, it remains important to think back to the historical background in Chapter One and to consider the problems of over 2000 years of Korean history if we are to understand the reasons for continuous conflict on the peninsula and the fears of the Korean people as they view the world.

Chapter Two also provides a summary of the development of North and South Korea since 1945. This foundation facilitates the discussion of the current situation on the peninsula in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three uses available literature to make a national power comparison between North and South Korea. The impact of the United States ground combat force presence in South Korea on this comparison is also examined. This chapter provides the key discussion concerning the necessity of a U.S. ground force presence to insure the sovereignty of South Korea.

The possible impact of other world powers in Northeast Asia is also mentioned. These include the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. However, the scope of this thesis allows only introduction of these variables and not a thorough examination.

Chapter Four examines U.S. interests and options concerning ground combat force utilization in Northeast Asia; and, specifically, how they are affected by events on the Korean Peninsula. It is in this chapter that the overall dynamics of Northeast Asia are discussed as they affect the situation on the Korean Peninsula. As previously stated, questions raised concerning the overall Northeast Asian situation are clearly stated and may be suitable for a future thesis to explore. Finally, Chapter Four concludes with a presentation of U.S. ground combat force employment options, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. These options are discussed in the context of their relationship to U.S. interests. The U.S. interests identified are further clarified as regional in scope or as directly involving U.S. security and survival as a nation.

Chapter Five presents the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. The hypothesis and each subhypothesis are addressed. In addition, weaknesses in the thesis presentation are discussed. Recommendations for follow-on study of additional areas or subjects are made.

Endnotes are presented at the end of each chapter.

Background[4]

The close of World War II in 1945 brought to an end 35 years of Japanese rule in Korea. Agreements[3] by the Allies during the war set the stage for division of Korea following World War II and the Korean War. Historically, the Korean Peninsula has been the site of numerous

conflicts. These conflicts have primarily resulted from the pressures of world powers surrounding the peninsula. Before we can understand the Korea of the 1980's and U.S. interests in Korea, we must first review the history of Korea and the historic importance of the Korean peninsula to all the nations in Northeast Asia.

Korea has been continuously surrounded by more powerful nations since her inception as a nation-state. Most historical accounts of the Korean view of history refer to a Korean perception of being a "shrimp among whales"[5] on the world scene. This philosophy may be even more appropriate today as the two Koreas work in the shadows of Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

The Korean Peninsula has historically been used as an invasion route either into Japan from Asia, or more recently in the 19th and 20th centuries, into Asia from Japan. In addition the peninsula dominates strategic naval passages along the East Asian coast. These passages will be identified and discussed in Chapter Four.

The origin of the Korean nation is shrouded in mystery and legend. It appears that the Korean Peninsula was originally settled through migration into the peninsula from Asia prior to 3,000 B.C. Early frictions between various tribes made unification difficult and resulted in a weak posture toward external neighbors.

One of the earliest, verified historical records of the Korean people concerns the early nation of Choson (Land of the Morning Calm or literally Freshness), which rose in the fourth century B.C. Choson was formed by an alliance of tribal groups. The people were primarily involved with agriculture, herding, and fishing activities.

The Chinese were the first to recognize the strategic value of the peninsula. In 108 B.C. Emperor Wu Ti of the Chinese Han dynasty invaded Korea and colonized the northern half of the peninsula. Yet, due to local resistance and Chinese inability to maintain control, by 75 B.C. all but one of the Chinese colony areas had been freed. The last area under Chinese control was liberated from the Chinese in the early fourth century.

From the late fourth century until the mid-seventh century, three kingdoms existed concurrently on the peninsula. They were Koguryo in the North, Paekche in the southwest, and Silla in the southeast. Koguryo was the kingdom which conquered the last Chinese colony area in 313 A.D.

The three kingdoms had repeated conflicts among themselves. Despite this, a Koguryo army of 300,000 beat back an invasion by a Chinese army of one million in 612 A.D.

Koguryo, possessing military ability superior to the other two kingdoms, sought to subordinate the other two kingdoms. Paekche often resorted to alliance with Silla and occasionally with Japan as a result. This strategy failed, however, when Silla conquered Paekche in 660 A.D. Silla, through an alliance with the Chinese T'ang dynasty, then conquered Koguryo in 668 A.D. Although this unified the peninsula, much of Koguryo's former territory in the north, particularly Manchuria, was lost to the T'ang dynasty during the conflict. China's seizure of some of the northern portions of Koguryo's former territory resulted in an eruption of hostilities between the peninsula, unified under Silla, and the T'ang dynasty of China. The eventual result was Chinese recognition of Silla

as a self-governing but tributary state. Unified Silla governed the peninsula based on the Chinese model of government and prospered on trade primarily with China and Japan. Yet, by the beginning of the 9th century Silla had gone into a severe decline.

The kingdom of Silla was important for a number of reasons. Silla was able to unify the peninsula as a single nation. This national unity was to last in various forms until the Japanese annexation in 1910 and eventual division into North and South Korea following World War II. In addition, the conflicts of the three kingdoms and the eventual unification under Silla all occurred in the shadows and under the pressure of nations surrounding Korea. China's influence in particular was the major factor in this period of Korean history.

During the last days of Silla in 935 A.D., General Wang Kon took over the government and established the kingdom of Koryo. Seoul and Pyongyang were two of the principal cities of this kingdom, and remain today as capitals of South and North Korea respectively. The Chinese style of government, with many officials being chosen by a type of Civil Service examination, remained. In 1170, General Chong Chung-bu seized power of the government. A two decade period of governmental inefficiency and weakening of the country followed before the situation temporarily stabilized.

1259 found Koryo (Korea) being invaded again, this time by the Mongols. The T'ang dynasty of China, to whom Koryo was a tributary, had collapsed and was unable to aid Koryo when the invasion occurred. The Mongols, using Koryo as a base, made two unsuccessful attempts to invade Japan, one in 1274 and one in 1281.

The Mongol invasion represented the first real attempt to use the peninsula as an invasion route into or out of Asia. It is probable that events in this period were not lost on the major powers in the region. For an Asian nation, possession of the peninsula could result in an ability to project power outside of the Asian mainland. Conversely, the Japanese concern over facing a hostile power on the peninsula developed.

In conjunction with the rise of the Ming dynasty in China, Koryo regained its independence from the Mongols in 1368, although internal strife lasted until 1388. Finally in 1392 the Yi dynasty was established.

The inability of the peninsula to control its own destiny should be noted. Again, the situation on the peninsula was dictated by the relative strengths and interests of the nations surrounding it.

The Yi dynasty lasted from 1392 to 1910. Early in the dynasty's reign, General Yi Song-gye moved the capital to Seoul (called Hanyang at the time). The name of Choson was adopted for the country, tying the nation to its beginnings when the peninsula was first settled.

During the 1500's, King Sejong recovered the northwest and northeast fringes of the peninsula.

In 1592 and again in 1598, the Japanese attempted to invade Choson as a first step to a planned conquest of China. In one of the most celebrated military actions in Korean history, Admiral Yi Sun-sin destroyed much of the Japanese fleet in a naval encounter in 1592. The Japanese were finally driven out of Choson (Korea) after the 1598 attempt.

The Japanese invasions clearly reflected Japanese interest in the peninsula and tacitly acknowledged the effect that events in the peninsula can have on Japan.

In 1627 and again in 1637 the Manchus, coming out of Asia, overran Choson. Choson subsequently became a vassal state of the Ch'ing dynasty of China in 1644. As a vassal state, Choson relied on some trade with China but otherwise pursued an isolationist policy until the Japanese reopened Choson in 1876.

The nineteenth century saw a tremendous weakening of Chinese influence over Korea as the European powers began making inroads into Asia and in particular China. Japan also seized upon this opportunity.

In 1876 the Japanese, who were rapidly growing in power, opened Choson, (now known as Korea to the western world), by forcing a treaty on Korea regarding trade and territorial rights. In an attempt to limit Japanese influence, Korea further expanded its economic and international contacts with a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States in 1882. Treaties with other countries rapidly followed: Britain and Germany in 1883, Russia and Italy in 1884, and France in 1886. Korea attempted to maintain its independence, reduce Japanese influence, and continue close ties with China through diversification of foreign relations. Inspite of these actions, Japan rapidly increased trade with Korea and by the 1890's was able to exert more influence in Korea than could China.

In 1894 a peasant rebellion called the Tonghak Rebellion broke out against the Korean government. Korea had been forced to continuously balance the surrounding powers against each other in an attempt to maintain its independence. In the case of the Tonghak Rebellion, the Korean government was fearful of the growing Japanese influence in the

country and the possibility that Japan might seize upon the rebellion as an opportunity to become militarily involved on the peninsula. As a result, the Korean government requested help from China to put down the uprising. However, Chinese assistance offered the Japanese an equally good excuse to enter the conflict. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 resulted. The Japanese were victorious and established effective dominance of the Korean nation.

While Korea was falling under the Japanese sphere of influence, Russia had been winning land concessions from the Chinese which resulted in a common Russian-Korean border along a short stretch of the northern border of Korea. Koreans, resentful and suspicious of the Japanese, turned to the Russians for assistance, another attempt at moderating Japanese influence. The Russians were only too glad to develop closer ties with Korea, for Russian eyes focused on the availability of natural resources in the peninsula and on the possibility of gaining access to warm-water ports. Soviet and Japanese interests in the peninsula inevitably clashed, resulting in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The Japanese emerged victorious and Korea formally became a Japanese protectorate as a result.

In 1910 Korea was annexed by Japan and became a Japanese colony. Korea remained under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945. During this period the Japanese exploited the resources of the peninsula and placed the Korean people in a position of subservience in both the government and their daily lives. Korean resistance, such as the 1919 independence demonstrations, was crushed.

A note to the occupation period which was to become an important factor was the founding of the Korean Communist Party in April 1925. Although this initial party formation did not last, it formed the first attempt at what eventually would become the government of North Korea. Kim Il Sung would eventually become the leader of the Korean communist movement. He was a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese in the 1930's and subsequently received training in the Soviet Union during World War II. Kim would emerge as the Soviet backed choice to head the North Korean government.

In 1937, as World War II opened, the Japanese used Korea as a logistical base for their invasion of Manchuria in China. Industry was built up in the northern portion of Korea while agriculture dominated the south. The Japanese enlisted volunteer Koreans in 1937 and drafted Koreans by 1942 to serve in the Japanese military forces.

On December 1, 1943, recognizing the probable eventual defeat of Japan and the need for administration of Japanese-held lands, the United States, China, and Britain signed the Cairo Declaration which among other items recognized that Korea should be a free nation in due course. The Potsdam Conference of July 1945 reaffirmed this decision with Soviet representation. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and within two days had troops entering Korea. Soviet troop entry into Korea set the stage for a planned temporary division of Korea into U.S. and Soviet occupation zones. The 38th parallel was the line chosen to divide the two occupation zones.

The United States has been militarily involved with events in Korea since the end of World War II. The development of this involvement

will be discussed briefly in Chapter Two and in detail in Chapters Three and Four.

Summary

The hypothesis which this thesis must address is dual-faceted. The first is determining the balance of power status between North and South Korea. The U.S. presence must then be added in to see if it plays a critical role in the balance. The second aspect is more difficult and involves determination of U.S. interests in the area, and the proper response to maintain those interests. These questions will have to be addressed in detail if the question of the necessity of U.S. ground combat forces in South Korea is to be answered.

The historical background presented in this chapter should provide a foundation for adequately examining the hypothesis.

ENDNOTES

1. See Chapter Four for a discussion of United States objectives and interests in Korea.

2. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Speech to the National Press Club, Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, p. 111.

3. The Cairo Declaration by the United States, Great Britain, and China; and reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 set the limits of post war Japanese territory. The Soviet declaration of war on Japan coupled with Soviet declaration of adherance to the Potsdam Conference agreement served as a "legitimate pretext for the U.S.S.R. to gain a foothold in Korea." Nena Vreeland, Peter Just, Kenneth Martindale, Robert Moeller, Sup-Shinn Rinn, South Korea, A Country Study, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-41, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, Second Edition. p.24

4. Ibid. The historical background summary was obtained primarily from this source with verification against other works.

5. Ibid., p.2.

CHAPTER TWO

POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENT

1945 To 1950

The current situation on the Korean Peninsula must be traced to the end of World War II. Japan had used Korea as a logistical base and labor source during the war. As Japanese defeat became imminent, the Soviet Union finally responded to the long-standing U.S. request for the USSR to enter the war against Japan.

The USSR had numerous reasons for entering the Pacific Theater of the war. Promotion of the Communist ideology, and liberation of the Korean people were promulgated publically. However, the Soviet Union was probably just as concerned with the opportunity to secure a portion of its border, gain access to more warm-water ports, and obtain some island territories from Japan.[1]

On August 24, 1945, Soviet occupation forces arrived in Pyongyang. Concurrently, the United States moved troops to Korea south of the 38th parallel. The United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to divide the country at the 38th parallel, with the Soviet Union accepting Japanese surrender in the north and the U.S. accepting the Japanese surrender in the south. Korea was to be occupied as a trusteeship for five years, after which this status was to be ended by reunification and independence.

While the Soviet Union agreed publically to this concept, it immediately moved to establish a friendly regime in the north which could also make a claim of legitimacy over the entire peninsula. This was evidenced immediately by the Soviet transfer of power to a nationalist and communist coalition, the People's Political Committee, on 26 August 1945.

On October 10, 1945, a meeting was held by the communist Korean factions in North Korea leading to the establishment of the North Korean Chapter of the Korean Communist Party. It was at this meeting that Kim Il Sung was installed as the head or General Secretary of the Communist Party in North Korea, a position he remains in today. Legitimacy was traced to the original founding of the Korean Communist Party in April 1925. Throughout 1946 communization of the country proceeded rapidly and in February, 1947, a convention of the People's Committee endorsed communization and elected the North Korean People's Assembly.

The process of communization was not smooth. The inclusion of the nationalists in the initial governing coalition seemed to be merely an expedient action to set up the initial governing body. The nationalists were rapidly outmanuevered and then purged from the government.

North Korean communists were by no means unified. Two principal factions existed within the communist group. One faction was made up of those Koreans who had worked from within the country during Japanese occupation. The other faction had resorted to armed struggle through a rebel army of sorts and had been forced to work primarily out of the Soviet Union.

The second faction had a built-in advantage of close ties to the Kremlin. Many of their leaders, Kim Il Sung in particular, had received training in Russia. The Soviets felt that better cooperation with North Korea could be achieved if their own protéges were in charge. This is exactly what happened under Soviet supervision.

While the Soviet Union was pursuing its own designs in the North, the United States proceeded with plans for reunification through the United Nations. In 1947 the United Nations declared that the Korean people should elect their own leaders. Elections were scheduled for 1948, but in January of that year, the Soviet occupation forces refused to admit the U.N. commission to the northern half of the country for the elections. On May 10, 1948, elections were held in the southern half of the country only. On May 14, the North Korean government and Soviet occupation forces shut off electric power to the south; and the break between the two Koreas was essentially complete.

Subsequent to these developments, North Korea adopted its own constitution on July 10, 1948. On September 9, 1948, the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was formally announced.

At this point it is important to remember that both Korean governments, North and South, claimed to be the legitimate government for the whole country. In the North, the Soviet Union not only supported a rapid military build-up, but provided help which resulted in a quality military force.

In South Korea, the United States assisted in the development of the South Korean Army. The United States believed that sufficient

deterrent strength existed in South Korea even though these forces were short on equipment and had significant leadership, organizational, and training deficiencies. As a result, U.S. occupation troops were withdrawn by June 1949. The remaining U.S. commitment consisted of a Military Advisory Group of 500 officers and men coupled with a bilateral defense agreement between the U.S. and South Korea.

The Korean War Period

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea in an attempt to reunify the country. The USSR was probably aware of the North Korean invasion plans. "Many historians and analysts believe that it was the Russians who triggered the North Korean aggression on June 25, 1950."[2] However, that exact responsibility for starting the invasion may have rested with the Chinese or the North Koreans. A definitive answer has not been found.

As the war opened, the difference in quality and numbers between North and South Korean forces was immediately evident. While the United States immediately took actions to move troops from Japan to Korea and, through the United Nations, made the South Korean effort a United Nations supported effort, total defeat of the South Korean forces was only staved off through establishment of the Pusan perimeter by deployed U.S. and South Korean forces. Eventually, 15 nations including the U.S. would send troops to fight in South Korea under United Nations sponsorship.

North Korean forces were depleted and had experienced significant strength reduction in their fight through most of South Korea. This factor, coupled with the U.S. troop buildup, enabled United Nations

forces to assume the offensive in a drive that pushed North Korean forces to the Yalu River.

The Soviet Union provided continuous military aid during the war to North Korea. Yet on 25 October 1950 it was the Chinese communists who intervened and again drove the U.N. forces well into South Korea. The Soviets, surprised by the strong United States support for the South,

> ...took refuge and comfort in shifting the burden of blame onto the Chinese, who were left to contain the American imperialists. The Soviets managed to maintain strategic control, for after all it was the Russians, not the Chinese, who proposed armistice talks in June 1951.[3]

The Chinese offensive was finally contained by the U.N. forces, largely increased by additional United States forces.

Again the U.N. forces went on the offensive and gained positions along the 38th Parallel by June 1951. Negotiations were initiated to bring hostilities to an end at this point.

The negotiations dragged on for two years, testing the wills of both sides as savage battles were fought for the stark terrain along the 38th Parallel. Finally, on 27 July 1953, an armistice was signed by the United Nations Command, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. South Korea was not a signatory to the armistice but has abided by its terms. The armistice led to the establishment of a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone between the two Koreas, with the Military Demarcation Line as the actual border in the center of this strip.

The armistice was never followed by an actual peace agreement. The resulting armed frontier has been the source of repeated incidents since the signing of the armistice.

1954 To 1961

North Korean military forces and the North Korean economy had been almost completely destroyed by the war. Through 1958, North Korea concentrated on reconstruction, both military and economic.

Kim Il Sung had become increasingly disillusioned with dependence on the PRC and USSR as negotiations dragged on during the war. While the USSR and China in particular forgave North Korean war debts and provided reconstruction aid, by 1956 Chinese-North Korean relations began to suffer as the Chinese-Soviet schism developed. Kim Il Sung attempted to face this problem by developing a national policy of self-reliance and remaining in a neutral position between the two great powers.

The economic policies in North Korea were directed at the building and maintenance of heavy industry. This policy was followed at consumer expense. Consumer items were deemphasized.

By 1958, North Korea's programs had resulted in a rebuilt military, a good start on an independent industrial capability, and a very independent outlook by the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung. Chinese withdrawal from North Korea was also completed in 1958.

In South Korea, the United States committed itself to rebuilding South Korea as the Chinese were doing with North Korea. Syngman Rhee had originally been elected president on July 20, 1948. His reelection in

1952, during the war, placed him in a position to guide the country's development following the war.

In 1954, Rhee supported an amendment to the constitution providing for a lifetime presidential term. While the United States continued to support the rebuilding effort, Rhee's regime continually grew more repressive in an effort to consolidate its power. This led to significant unrest, particularly on the part of students. However, from 1954 to 1960 South Korea was able to repair much of the damage from the Korean War and initiate economic growth.

Civil pressure eventually forced Rhee's resignation on April 26, 1960. The Rhee resignation was followed by a parliamentary form of government headed by Prime Minister Chang Myon. This government was largely ineffective and unable to make significant progress on the nation's ills. As a result, on May 16, 1961, a military coup replaced the existing government with a military junta headed by Major General Park Chung Hee.

The U.S. presence on the peninsula was important in providing insulation for the developing South from outside interference. In spite of the governmental turmoil and civil unrest, the South Korean military and economy were largely rebuilt. What remained was for the country to gain a more cohesive government to determine goals and direction.

While tensions between the two Koreas remained high from 1954 to 1961, both were concerned with their own individual rebuilding programs and power consolidation. In the North, Kim Il Sung was particularly concerned in fortifying his position and silencing his critics. Kim had

drawn many enemies as he had begun his drive to emphasize heavy industry and as he promoted a personality cult intended to place his thoughts and ideas as the permanent guiding ideology of the North Korean nation-state. From the period 1956 through 1958 Kim cooled relations with both the PRC and USSR, gradually silenced his pro-USSR and pro-PRC critics and took North Korea on an independent path.

While unable to devote attention to South Korea during this period, Kim still held the belief that the North Korean government was the only legitimate government for all of the peninsula. Kim's dream for reunification of the peninsula under his leadership remained his chief goal.

The Park Regime, 1961 To 1979

After taking over the reins of power in South Korea, Major General Park Chung Hee rapidly moved to accomplish three objectives: consolidate his power, further strengthen the economy, and continue to strengthen the South Korean military. Park wanted to do this in an atmosphere free of the civil unrest and turmoil of the late 1950's. The martial law regime eventually formed a plan for election of a civilian government in 1963. Concurrently, Kim Jong-pil, a member of the junta, was laying the foundation for the Democratic Republican Party. This party would become Park's power base as he, Park, was elected president of the civilian government in October 1963.

Park's consolidation of power continued as he was reelected for a second term in 1967; backed an amendment which allowed him, Park, to serve more than two presidential terms in 1969; and was again reelected

in 1971 and 1972. The 1972 election followed wholesale political changes made by Park in October 1972 which effectively allowed him unlimited tenure and power as the president.

Economic growth was initially pursued through normalization of relations with Japan. Steps to ensure economic growth were begun under the junta, continued after Park's election as President and finalized in 1965. Access to Japanese financing coupled with continued internal economic development resulted in an economic surge during the mid to late 1960's.

By the mid 1970's, South Korea was becoming an economic force internationally. Its army was one of the largest in the free world. Yet, its government had become more autocratic with less opportunity for the electorate to influence it.

North Korea entered the 1960's by plunging into extreme economic problems. Diplomatic isolation, Kim Il Sung's policies of self-reliance, and internal failures all played a part.

In spite of these economic difficulties, North Korea began to explore ways to reduce the credibility of the government in the South which would eventually lead to reunification. Actions included an unsuccessful attempt to reform the communist party in the South in 1964, and a decision to gain the capability of a military option. The decision to obtain a viable military option led to a huge increase in North Korean military expenditures and to the use of numerous subversive operations against the South. In particular, a North Korean commando team made an assassination attempt against Park Chung Hee in January 1968, the U.S.

Navy's Pueblo was seized, and a U.S. plane was attacked. However, by 1969 North Korea began shifting its methods for achieving reunification to diplomatic and economic activity. Yet, this change was solely aimed at achieving reunification on North Korean terms and in no way altered previous North Korean objectives.

North Korean actions have been influenced by both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the Korean War. The split between these two powers has caused the North Korean nation to attempt to maintain a middle road, to obtain aid from both sources although the PRC has probably enjoyed a closer relationship.

The 1970's found the North Koreans continuing to build their military and economic capabilities rapidly, while pursuing diplomatic attempts to isolate South Korea internationally, gain recognition as the sole legitimate government on the peninsula, and force evacuation of United States forces from South Korea. Territorial unification was considered to be a long range goal, but the very nature of Kim Il Sung's policy of self-reliance and the country's independence from outside influence makes North Korea an unpredictable force to deal with.

A critical phase in South Korean-U.S. relations occurred immediately after the 1976 U.S. presidential elections. Then President Carter made the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops from Korea one of his campaign promises. Carter viewed the natural resources of the South Koreans as a sufficient base, if properly used, to deter North Korean attack and if necessary to defeat that attack.

The New Republic, in its June 11, 1977 issue, stated Carter's case in this manner:

> South Korea is scarcely the weak, semi-defenseless country it was in 1950, and the Carter Administration intends to use the next five years to complete a modernization process designed to upgrade its military forces still more. The South has double the North's population and five times its gross national product. There are 100,000 more men in South Korea's Army than North Korea's, though the North is thought to enjoy superiority in tanks and artillery. The rugged terrain near the Demilitarized Zone favors the side defending against attacks - the South, presumably - and the United States intends to equip the South with anti-tank weapons which might eliminate the North's advantages in armor. A Congressional Budget Office analysis concluded this spring that "overall, the military balance - despite important assymetries- seems even enough to present substantial risk to North Korea that an attack could fail"[4]

The New Republic went on to discuss the hostage force aspect of an American ground combat presence in Korea. This concept viewed ground forces as insuring a U.S. presence in any hostilities which would erupt through immediate involvement of American forces. The New Republic article claimed that Carter wanted to avoid this automatic commitment, but not at the price of the failure of the South Korean government. This concept will be discussed further in Chapter Four of the thesis.

While some elements of the U.S. ground presence were initially withdrawn, an immediate controversy arose over the Carter withdrawal policy. The end result was an indefinite delay in the withdrawal until the situation in Korea and the balance of power in the region could be reassessed.

Through the 1970's, North Korea continued an immense military buildup and further expanded its international diplomatic and economic

contacts in a continuing effort to isolate South Korea. In spite of North Korean activity on the diplomatic front, there is no evidence to indicate that North Korea has given up a military option should the opportunity present itself. In fact, activities such as North Korean tunneling efforts under the Demilitarized Zone, coupled with the continuing emphasis on military buildup, and the Blue House incident, indicate that North Korea's leaders would seize upon any military opportunity where the chances of success were acceptable.

November 1979 To Present

In October 1979 the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Jae Kyu, assassinated President Park Chung Hee. Questions remain today about the motive for the slaying. Whatever the reasons, the assassination set off a year of political turbulence in South Korea.

Choi Kyu Hah became the acting president and promised to hold elections in 1981. In addition, many of the strict autocratic controls concerning curfews, political dissent, and censorship were eased. As controls were lifted, previously suppressed dissatisfaction with the government became visible. Factionalism and unrest rapidly developed.

In the South Korean Army, a December 1979 coup resulted in the Army Chief of Staff - General Chung Seung Hwa - being replaced. A number of other senior officers in the South Korean Army were also replaced. The justification used was that General Chung was in some way involved with Park's assassination. The coup was masterminded by MG Chun Doo Hwan, the head of the powerful Defense Security Command. Chun rapidly

became the most powerful figure in the country over the next several months.

While Army reorganization proceeded after the December 1979 coup, various political leaders were also manuevering for influence in the post-Park government.

> The most notable among them was Kim Dae Jung who was looked on by many as the leader and symbol of the dissident movement in South Korea. Kim had been opposition candidate in 1971 in the last popular election for the presidency and had come within a million votes of unseating Park. Since 1973, when he was kidnapped from his hotel room in Tokyo and returned to Seoul by agents of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim had been living either under house arrest or in jail. His restriction had been lifted on December 7 and, with the restoration of his full rights, he intensified the organization of his political supporters in anticipation of the presidential and parlimentary elections promised by Choi.
>
> This brought him into conflict with Kim Young Sam, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP), and the mainstream of the party which backed the controversial leader, whose increasing confrontations with Park in 1979 were credited by many with having led to Park's downfall. The main issues between the two Kims were firstly the extent to which the NDP should accept Choi's promises of democratization rather than pressure the government to speed up the process and secondly the terms under which Kim Dae Jung and his supporters should rejoin the NDP. (Kim had left the party in 1978 in protest against the actions of an earlier leader.) During six weeks of intense political manoeuvring, which was marked by the outbreak of violence at several provincial rallies, the two men struggled to secure their hold on the NDP, as leadership was seen as the guarantee of nomination as presidential candidate. By April 6 when it had become clear that Kim Young Sam maintained his strong hold over the NDP organization, Kim Dae Jung renounced his intention of rejoining the NDP and instead began putting together a broad coalition of former anti-Park activists.
>
> During this period the former government party of the Park era, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), now led by Kim Jong Pil, was also facing internal dissentions of its own. Some younger members pushed strongly for purification

> of the party by excluding those members who were said to have abused their positions for personal gain during the Park regime. Kim Jong Pil attempted to lead the DRP away from its close identification with the government by espousing a number of reform policies and by cooperating with the NDP in the National Assembly to draw up a draft of a new Constitution. The issue of authorship of the new basic law became a matter of dispute between the assembly, which moved ahead quickly from December in an all-party committee, and the government which insisted on the president's right to initiate the revision but failed to begin work on it until March. During the early months of the year the relaxation of political and social restrictions maintained during the later Park years and the disappearance of all the overt signs of the martial law imposed immediately after the assassination encouraged a sense of liberalism unfamiliar to most South Koreans. The moves within the army in December were largely forgotten.[5]

After the lifting of political restraints, political parties, students, and workers all began pressure upon the government for reform. While the government made some concessions, in other areas it did not move fast enough to satisfy critics. Chun's appointment as acting director of the KCIA heightened fears that promised democratic reforms would not take place.

Large demonstrations in early May 1980 in Seoul became violent and resulted in the military being able to convince Acting President Choi to invoke martial law. Political leaders were arrested and colleges and universities were closed. The ensuing political purge was controlled by the military.

> The military takeover was said to have been necessary because of threatening troop movements by North Korea and because a coalition of opposition groups led by Kim Dae Jung was planning an uprising on May 22 with the intention of toppling the government.[6]

This justification appeared to be based more on a need for an excuse for the military to act than on actual fact.

One of the reactions to the crackdown was an uprising in Kwangju from May 18th through May 27th, which resulted in a virtual assault on the town by the military. This unrest spread throughout the Cholla province before it was finally controlled. The military continued the process of controlling the political structure of the country, begun prior to the Kwangju incident, into the summer. On August 16, 1980, Acting President Choi resigned, paving the way for General Chun to retire from the Army and be elected president by the electoral college set up under the Yushin Constitution.

President Chun immediately promised reforms and promulgated a new constitution which made the presidential term seven years, and under which he could not serve a second term. Critics have expressed skepticism that the promised free elections will take place in 1988.[7]

North Korea noted the turmoil in the South. By the late 1970's, the preferred route to reunification was through influencing the political structure within South Korea. However, this was sought concurrently with a North Korean military buildup which would assure the existance of a military option.

The political upheaval in the South appeared to offer the North an opening. In January 1980, North Korea sent 11 letters to key politicians and leaders in South Korea. One of the letters was written from North Korean Prime Minister Lee Jong Ok to his opposite in the South, Shin Hon Hwack, acknowledging the government of the South for the first time and

proposing direct talks between North and South Korea. A total of 10 meetings were actually held, however, no agenda was agreed upon. North Korea broke off the talks in September, 1980.[8]

Apparently, once President Chun consolidated power in the South, North Korea could see no basis for continuing the dialogue.

Concurrent with its diplomatic activities, North Korea has continued to build up both the size and quality of its armed forces, along with the production facilities to support the military.

Summary

Today, the Korean Peninsula and its people stand at the end of a 2,000-plus year past, with a future of uncertainty. Two governments claim legitimacy for ruling the entire peninsula and are diametrically opposite in their governmental philosophies.

The great powers traditionally interested in the affairs on the peninsula remain concerned. These powers are Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Since World War II the United States has added its interests to this group.

The background presented in this chapter is essential in preparing to address the need for U.S. ground troops in South Korea. The key elements of that study involve two variables: the relative strength of the two Koreas and examination of the validity of U.S. interests in South Korea. Chapter Three addresses relative strengths of the two Koreas including the effect of the United States on the situation. Chapter Four then explores U.S. interests on the peninsula.

ENDNOTES

1. "Korea In Context, A Primer on the Dynamics of Northeast Asia." A Special Report, Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., July 1977, pp.3,4.

2. William M. Carpenter, "The Korean War: A Strategic Perspective Thirty Years Later." Comparative Strategy, Volume 2, Number 4, 1980, pp.338-340.

3. Ibid., p.340.

4. "Carter's Koreanization Plan." The New Republic, June 11, 1977, p.5.

5. "Korea-South, Politics and Social Affairs." Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981 Yearbook, 1981, p.175.

6. Ibid., p.176.

7. Mike Tharp, "Buying Time For Change." Far Eastern Economic Review, November 12-18, 1982, p.42.

8. "Korea-South, Politics and Social Affairs." Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981 Yearbook, 1981, p.178.

CHAPTER THREE

COMPARISON OF POWER: SOUTH KOREA vs. NORTH KOREA

Introduction

Prior to examining the need for U.S. ground combat troops in South Korea and the appropriateness of that commitment in light of U.S. national interests, it is necessary to make a direct comparison of power between the two Koreas. This analysis is made difficult by a number of factors not the least of which is the closed nature of the North Korean government and the difficulty in examining each of the Koreas in a semi-vacuum by not considering the introduction of foreign combat elements should a conflict between the Koreas occur.

The basic analysis will be performed by discussing the five basic elements of national power; military, political, economic, national will, and geography; and comparing these elements to determine whether each of them favors either North or South Korea. In the conclusion of the chapter the sum total of the effects of all five areas will be analyzed to determine if an advantage exists with either side, and if so whether that advantage could allow the nation with the advantage to exert its will over the other. The results of this chapter will be used as a base for discussion in Chapter Four on the need for U.S. forces, particularly ground combat forces, in South Korea based on U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.

Military Factors

Military might is the most visible and normally the first element of power that is used in comparing the power of two nations. While this thesis will examine the military element of power first, final conclusions on the relative power of North Korea vs. South Korea will be made based on the sum effects of the five elements of national power; military, political, economic, national will, and geographic.

An initial examination of the size of the active military forces shows a slight advantage on the North Korean side.

ACTIVE MILITARY SIZE[1]

	NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA
ARMY	700,000	520,000
NAVY	33,000	25,000
MARINES	0	24,000
AIR FORCE	51,000	32,600
TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE	784,000	601,600

However, any examination of military power must look beyond the number of personnel and into the organization, equipment, and dispositions of the forces.

The marks of an offensive ground capability since World War II have been armored power, mobility, and artillery. In all three areas, North Korean forces possess a large advantage over the South Koreans. The North possesses 2,825 tanks to 1,000 in the South. 2,200 of the North Korean tanks are T-54, T-55, or T-62's. The South Korean tanks are primarily M-47 or M-48 models. Similar advantages for the North show up in armored personnel carriers and artillery.

EQUIPMENT COMPARISON[2]

	NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA
TANKS	2,825	1,000
ARTILLERY PIECES	4,100	2,104
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS	1,140	850
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS	2,000	0
MORTARS	11,000	5,300

Appendix 1 contains a complete breakdown of the military forces of North and South Korea. This breakdown further shows the North with an advantage in antitank weapons systems and air defense weapons. North Korea also possesses 54 FROG 5/7 surface-to-surface missiles opposite which the South possesses only 12 Honest John missiles.

Organizationally, South Korea's forces are organized primarily around infantry divisions. Only one mechanized division and no armored divisions are present in the military structure. The South does possess three airborne divisions and two special forces brigades.[3] The overall organization with its attendant equipment is a potent defensive force. However, projection of power in an offensive mode would be limited.

North Korea, conversely, has a force that has been constructed with an ability to project an offensive capability from the start. Besides outnumbering the South numerically in men and equipment, North Korea has two armored divisions, three motorized infantry divisions, five separate armored brigades, and two separate armored regiments.[4] These mobile forces coupled with the North Korean infantry divisions give the North a rapid offensive strike capability that is extremely capable in relation to the size of the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean Army also

has approximately 100,000 men assigned to 17 special forces brigades and 3 amphibious commando brigades; and 5 river crossing regiments.[5] All of these elements doctrinally serve primarily in offensive roles.

Air superiority or the ability to achieve it would certainly affect any conflict on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea currently holds an advantage of 700 combat aircraft to 434 combat aircraft in the South.[6]

> The key element of NKAF strategy will be the destruction of ROK/USAF aircraft while these are still on the ground. If the air war must be won in dog fights then the quality of the aircraft and pilot proficiency will work against the NKAF.[7]

The current numerical superiority of the North in this area could very well result in a capability to defeat the South in the air were it not for the additional U.S. air assets.

On the sea, both the North and South Korean Navies are primarily concerned with the waters adjacent to the Korean Peninsula. However, the North Korean Navy, in addition to securing North Korean waters, has consistently developed a capability to project its power along the South Korean coastline. While details of the naval vessels possessed by both North and South Korea can be found at Appendix 1, there are certain points which are noteworthy. The North Korean Navy possesses 19 submarines to none for the South, although the South does have one submarine on order from the United States.[8] Additional naval assets of note are shown below:

NAVAL VESSELS[9]

	NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA
SUBMARINES	19	0
DESTROYERS	0	11
FRIGATES/CORVETTES	4	10
MSL/GUN ESCORTS	18	8
COASTAL PATROL BOATS/PTF	391	36
MINESWEEPERS	0	9
LANDING SHIPS/LARGE	9	8
LANDING SHIPS/MEDIUM	15	10
ASSAULT CRAFT/SMALL	75	10

The large number of North Korean coastal patrol boats combined with their assault craft in particular give the North a capability to shell the coastline of the South as well as to land commando teams aimed at disrupting rear areas of the South. "As can be readily seen from an overview of developments, it is going to be extremely difficult to counter the North Korean infiltration and amphibious assault forces with existing South Korean ships."[10]

Once armed with an overview of existing active forces it becomes easier to postulate concerning their relative power in the event of a conflict. Current deployments, coupled with the locations of natural objectives can help formulate what form a conflict might take. While both North and South Korea have claimed a legitimate right to rule the entire peninsula, it is the North which has set as a tenet of its government reunification - by force if necessary. The South, while desiring unification, has stressed peaceful means and has exhibited more concern with maintaining its own independence rather than subverting the North. The result of these two different philosophies has been the

development of an offensive capability in the North and the building of a defensive force which is tied into extensive military fortifications in the South.

The most probable military scenario, should a conflict occur, points to a lightening attack across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by North Korea. The principal objective of the attack would be the seizure of Seoul.

> A mass onslaught by North Korean forces through these corridors would be difficult, though not impossible, to halt short of Seoul. Such a blitzkrieg would be presumably by immediately preceeded by air and commando strikes on airfields, air defense sites, and communications centers, aimed at securing air superiority over the battlefield and sowing confusion in rear areas.[11]

Another consideration in the scenario which has been described is the natural advantage which goes to the attacker in terms of surprise and the ability to concentrate forces. The North's already considerable numerical advantage in men and particularly in equipment could be greatly improved when they concentrate forces in the breakthrough area for the attack.

One area which has not been addressed thus far in this discussion of military power is that of reserve or paramilitary forces.

> The paramilitary reserve forces of North Korea are composed of three elements, the Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG), the Red Youth Guard (RYG), and the Paramilitary Training Units (PMTU). Their combined strength is approximately 1,367,000 of which 187,000 can be considered filler elements for the North Korean Army (NKA). The Worker Peasant Guard is directly subordinate to the North Korean Workers Party (KWP) and is composed of approximately 753,000 physically fit, politically reliable males and

females. The wartime mission of the WPRG units is primarily local defense, although some units may be designated for utilization in a rear service role. WPRG units, commanded and staffed by civilian KWP officials, are organized in echelons from company to regiment level throughout North Korea in direct relationship to population density. The Red Youth Guard, subordinate to the KWP, is composed of selected students over age 14. The Red Youth Guard is designed to heighten esprit de corps in military training given to students, and to increase political control at all levels. RYG members receive only general military training and are not considered a viable military force. Paramilitary Training Units, subordinate to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF), are primarily composed of discharged NKA veterans employed in major industries. PMTU's are organized at major industries throughout North Korea, generally in battalion and regimental strength, and are staffed by NKA personnel. PMTU's are better trained and better equipped than WPRG units and can be rapidly mobilized by the NKA in time of war. They are designed to maintain a base of ready reserves which the NKA can draw upon for local defense, filler units, or replacements.[12]

The South Korean reserve forces carry a similar mission to those in the North in a military sense. Reservists directly under the control of a service will be used to augment the strength of that service. The Homeland Reserves, Civilian Defense Corps, and Student Homeland Defense Force are primarily organized for local defense missions.

In spite of all the reserve forces listed, due to conflicts in manpower requirements such as for industry and farming, and due to the young untrained members of these manpower pools, probably no more than 500,000 could be rapidly mobilized for anything other than local defense in the North or South. However, in any protracted conflict, the advantage will steadily swing to South Korea.

A breakdown of known paramilitary forces is shown in the table below:

RESERVE FORCES[13,14]

	NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA
ARMY[12]	260,000	1,100,000
NAVY[13]	40,000	25,000
MARINES[13]		60,000
AIR FORCE[13]		55,000
PARAMILITARY		
Security Force Border Guards[13]	38,000	
Worker Peasant Red Guard[14]	753,000	
Homeland Reserve Defense Force[13]		3,300,000
Civilian Defense Corps[12]		4,400,000
Student Homeland Defense Force[13]		1,820,000
Paramilitary Training Units and Red Youth Guard[14]	614,000	

It must be remembered that the North Korean numbers are only estimates. Actual totals may be higher. In addition, the highly regimented system of life in North Korea probably would make their reserves and paramilitary forces initially more responsive.

The eventual advantage that South Korea might obtain in a protracted conflict reinforces the possible North Korean attack scenario which has previously been discussed.

The conclusion that an examination of the military forces of North and South Korea leads to is that North Korea possesses a significantly greater military capability than South Korea. However, the size and quality of the South Korean forces make it questionable whether an invasion of South Korea by the North would succeed even if the South

Koreans were forced to stand without U.S. ground combat troop assistance. A further discussion of this question will be made after the other elements of national power can be added into the equation.

Political Factors

The political aspect of national power may be the weakest link in the South Korean armor and at the same time its greatest potential for strength. The South Korean government is essentially a dictatorship which supervises a legislative and judicial bureaucracy which runs a country built on nearly a free market economy. As discussed in Chapter Two, the South Korean government has had three periods of autocratic leadership with brief interims of unrest between the governments of Rhee, Park, and now Chun. These dictatorships, particularly Park's, were effective in maintaining a unity of effort toward national goals, and tremendous growth economically and militarily. On the other hand, the autocratic governments have generated an ever increasing number of dissidents and have fostered political opposition from numerous directions.

The difficulty which has occurred during every succession of leadership in South Korea has historically provided windows of governmental weakness which could have been exploited by North Korea. In addition, the autocratic rule of Park and now Chun, coupled with crackdowns on dissidents, have caused South Korea to have image problems within the United States. Any strain in the bonds which tie South Korea to its strongest ally, the United States, is sure to be a sign of weakness in the eyes of the North Koreans.

Currently, the political situation in the South has stabilized under Chun. "On August 27 (1980), the former paratrooper was elected unopposed as the fifth president of the Republic of Korea by the rubber stamp electoral college set up under Park's Yushin Constitution."[15] A new constitution has been set in place to replace the Yushin Constitution. Under it, the term of the president has been extended from six to seven years and a prohibition placed upon seeking a second term. "The president was to be elected indirectly by a college of more than 5,000 delegates, but unlike the Yushin method, the delegates and the candidates for president themselves would be politically aligned."[16] In 1981, Chun was elected President and was subsequently inaugurated in March 1981. Chun has essentially eliminated effective political opposition and has a tight control on the government.

North Korea functions under a communist government under the total control of Kim Il Sung. Kim is the president of the government and the general secretary of the Korean Workers Party. The control of the communist party is total, extending into the educational, economic, and home lives of the North Koreans as well as controlling political affairs. The party serves to insure a unified sense of direction within the country. That consensus can only be broken by leadership struggles for power within the party.

With Kim Il Sung's advanced age, the speculation over successors and the effect that his death would have is widespread. The Sixth Party Congress in October 1980 resulted in the emergence of Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il Sung, as the apparent choice of Kim Il Sung for his

successor. This choice caused some ripples in the communist world as it may give somewhat an appearance of nepotism to the North Korean change.

The key political consideration which arises out of an examination of the North Korean political situation is the question of Kim Il Sung's intent. Kim has set reunification, militarily if necessary, as his life's goal.

> Kim has long prepared to make the military option credible. Since the fifth congress of the Korean Workers' Party in November 1970, Pyongyang has sustained a massive program of military modernization which has reversed the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula dramatically in its favor.[17]

Now, Kim's advancing age combined with visible improvements in the South Korean military and political structure may be closing a last window of vulnerability into which the North could still exercise the military option.

The last area which an examination of the political element of power must consider is that of international alliances, and agreements. Neither South nor North Korea are members of the United Nations. South Korea's international cornerstone is its relationship with the United States. The 1954 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty states that an attack on either the U.S. or South Korea in the Pacific will be considered as an attack on both. The treaty does not specify a required response in the event of an attack nor does it require the United States to maintain a military presence in Korea. The other key actor from the South Korean perspective is Japan. While there is no direct military tie between Japan and South Korea, they are indirectly related through their mutual

close ties to the United States. In addition, the 1965 Normalization Treaty with Japan has had two important results. First, Japan has become the largest source of investment capital for South Korea. Second, South Korea has also become Japan's second largest export customer. Coupled with a Japanese aversion to having an unfriendly power control the peninsula, South Korea may be able to count on some aid from Japan even if it is not necessarily military.

North Korea for its part has defense arrangements with both the PRC and the Soviet Union. It is highly probable that both countries would honor those commitments if North Korea was invaded. The question of Soviet or PRC support to North Korea in the event North Korea invaded South Korea is much more complicated. If pressed, the Soviets and the PRC would undoubtedly assist with equipment and material to some extent. However, assistance in the form of troops is doubtful unless the war were to turn against the North and the North Korean territory was subsequently invaded.

Comparison of the political element of power between the two Koreas has a remarkable congruity. Both systems are currently autocratic although the communist government in the North is distinctly more so. Political vulnerability would exist in either state during power changes in leadership at the national level. Currently the consolidation of power in the South under Chun should stabilize the situation there until the late 1980's. That leaves the largest political question in Kim Il Sung's hands; the question of how long he is willing to wait before resorting to a military option. However, from this analysis, at the

present, the political element of power cannot be seen to present an advantage to either the North or the South barring intervention of an external power.

Economic Factors

North and South Korea have had one similarity in that both have had to essentially rebuild their economies since the Korean War. However, the similarity ends at that point. The North Korean economy operates on a totally state-controlled economy. The South Korean economic system is built primarily on a free market system with some governmental regulation.

The economic element of power is perhaps North Korea's greatest weakness in relation to the South. North Korea is continuing to attempt to follow a policy of self reliance; the ability to locally produce goods which are necessary in the economy and for self defense. Means of production are owned and controlled by the state. Agricultural production has been collectivized. The communist government has placed the building and improving of heavy industry as its top priority. Consumer products have taken a distinctly back seat although increasing emphasis has been received in this area. However, in spite of all these steps, the North Korean economy remains far less prolific than that of the South, the standard of living is lower for the population, and the North continues to experience problems with foreign debt.

"North Korea is rich in minerals and metals (coal, iron, lead, zinc, copper, tungsten, nickel, manganese, graphite, etc.) and in water power potential."[18] This has facilitated the country's emphasis on

heavy industry, the policy of self reliance, and a buildup of military capability. Agricultural production however, is restricted by a harsh climate which essentially limits the growing season to one crop a year.

Problems, particularly that of foreign debt, surfaced in the mid-1970's. During this period North Korea launched into a buying spree of western technology from Japan, Sweden, and France in particular. The explosion in oil prices in 1974, coupled with "the subsequent worldwide recession and lowered demand for North Korean minerals, left the country unable to pay as planned for the purchases."[19] The result was a cutback in imports and economic development programs along with a reduction in the portion of the GNP being used for defense. However, the foreign debt problem still continues to hamper North Korean economic development.

In South Korea, a virtual economic explosion took place from the late 1960's to 1979. A February 27, 1981 Department of State Briefing Paper summarizes conditions:

> The Republic of Korea is a vital, dynamic nation now on the verge of joining the world's advanced industrial societies. Per capita GNP grew from approximately $70 at the end of the Korean War in 1953 to an estimated $1775 in 1980. The economy is as dynamic as it is diverse. Korea is now the world's leading shipbuilder. The construction industry is rapidly modernizing all aspects of Korea's infrastructure and is increasingly effective in the larger arena of world construction competition. Limited resources and energy shortages are largely offset by dynamic trade policies and innovative technology. Contracts have been let for nine nuclear power plants and more are forthcoming. The large and growing heavy industrial sector is adding its wares to the traditional exports of Korea's light industrial sector. Korea produces about 12 million tons of steel and hopes to complete its

second integrated steel complex this decade, expanding annual production to 30 million tons, an output exceeded only by the super powers and Japan.

After nearly two decades of rapid economic growth, Korea's economy slipped into recession in late 1979. External and internal factors caused the slump which continued through 1980 and reduced the GNP by 5.7%. Oil price increases in 1979 doubled Korea's oil import costs from $3 billion to $6 billion, gave a massive boost to inflation, and weakened the balance of payments. A slowdown in the developed world economies which provide markets for Korea's industry weakened the vital export sector. These external factors coincided with a stabilization program designed to cope with the structural inefficiencies which had developed during the headlong industrialization of the 1970s. The rapid expansion had driven wages up faster than productivity. Increasing prosperity had boosted consumer demand and inflation. As a result, Korea was quickly losing its price competitiveness in the light industrial sector (textiles, electronics, etc.) on which economic health was still significantly dependent.

These congruent problems would have been enough, but the year-long political instability which followed President Park's assassination in October 1979 reduced governmental efficiency, discouraged investment and delayed effective economic solutions.

As a new government emerged in late summer 1980, efforts were focused on wage policy and on a much-needed reorganization of the heavy industrial sector. Some sweeping reorganization measures announced in the autumn of 1980 were poorly prepared and probably will be only partially implemented, but the new government has now become more realistic about "quick fixes" by fiat. The Government is determined to slow the rise in real wages and it is already having some success in restoring Korean export competitiveness.

Inclement weather resulted in a disastrously poor rice harvest in 1980. Only 3.6 million tons were produced, far below the annual consumption of 5.7 million tons. Korea has been scouring world markets to make up the 2.4 million ton short-fall, but market supplies of the Japonica types of rice readily acceptable in the Korean market are limited. As a result, prices have risen rapidly. American growers are expected to sell a record 1 - 1.2 million tons of rice to Korea this crop year at good prices.

> Although the problems are not minor, Korea has the potential to realize its ambition of becoming a fully industrialized nation by the end of the decade. While it possesses few natural resources, its work force is industrious and adaptable, its entrepreneurs effective, and government economic planning and effectiveness generally are of a high caliber. The 35% of the work force still in agriculture provides a reservoir of labor for further expansion. Koreans have proven their ability to organize production and compete in international markets. The ideological and social climate remains favorable for renewed growth. The confidence of international financial circles in the underlying strength and resilience of the Korean economy appears justified by past performance and a demonstrated ability to make the tough economic decisions needed to retain balance.
>
> Factors which could impede future growth are a lack of energy resources, stagnation in international trade, weakness in the technological base, or political instability. The phalanx of solid Korean economic planners understand these factors, and much of the government's energy is devoted to dealing with them.[20]

The lack of internal natural resources and the dependence of the South Korean economy on foreign trade will require the South Koreans to continue to be extremely active in international markets. A regional development of significance has been the tremendous growth of the South Korean - Japanese economic connection. South Korea's largest source of investment capital is in Japan while South Korea has become Japan's second largest export market. The growth of these ties coupled with geographic considerations which will be discussed later are gradually making the security of South Korea a Japanese concern.

South Korea is taking steps to balance its dependence on foreign goods. It is diversifying its energy acquisition sources and moving toward greater use of coal; all in an attempt to reduce reliance on Mideast oil. South Korea, like North Korea, is also building a defense

industry of its own. Although it has not reached the scope of the effort in the North, it will no doubt continue to grow.

Comparison of the economic strengths of North and South Korea are extremely difficult. The paucity of reliable information concerning North Korea coupled with the vast differences between the two economies make most comparisons meaningless. However, examination of the precent of the gross national product spent on defense may yield some insights. The following table shows some selected years since 1970:

PERCENT OF GNP SPENT ON DEFENSE[21]

	NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA
1970	25%	4.44%
1975	25%	8.1%
1977	10.5%	8.3%
1979	11.4%	7%
1982	9%	6.3%

Some interesting facts are revealed. The tremendously high expenditure on defense in the early 1970's by North Korea has shown up in the North Korean Army in terms of personnel and equipment increases. However, coupled with other economic factors, this high level of defense spending contributed to the economic problems the North ran into in the mid-1970's and which persist today. The result has been a slowdown of defense spending although it still continues at a rate above that of the South.

The results of an overall economic analysis yield certain conclusions concerning the two Koreas. The South possesses a stronger, more diversified economy that in the long run will be difficult for the

North to match. The key variable detracting from South Korea's abilities is the need for access to imported raw materials. North Korea, on the other hand, still holds the lead in heavy industry; defense items in particular. This would provide North Korea a short term economic advantage in the event a conflict erupted over the next few years. However, the long term economic future clearly favors South Korea. Any economic advantage currently possessed by the North will be lost within a decade. In terms of a peacetime edge, and the ability to provide for its people, the advantage is already clearly with South Korea.

National Will

South and North Korea have two diametrically opposed societies. North Korea has been built on a totally state controlled system, dedicated to the welfare of the nation first, and organized around a personality cult extolling Kim Il Sung. South Korea, the history of autocratic governments notwithstanding, has a fairly open society internally operating on a free market system which places emphasis on the individual.

The closed nature of North Korea makes analysis of its national will difficult. However, the population of the country is young with the majority of the population having been born since the end of World War II. This means that they have been subjected to the communist ideology and the deification of Kim Il Sung since birth. The North Korean government has attempted to portray their reunification efforts as a continuing nationalistic struggle to liberate the country. There is little indication that the vast majority of the citizenry is not

committed to the country. Combined with the mandatory obedience to governmental authority, this would indicate the North Koreans to be a staunch foe in support of their government should a conflict erupt.

North Korea is not without weakness. The recent reduction in the percentage of the GNP which is devoted to defense spending may have resulted in part from internal pressures requiring the government to devote more attention to satisfying consumer needs. However, this is not a large enough factor to affect the ability of North Korea militarily over the next decade.

South Korea, for its part, remains staunchly anticommunist. In spite of the volatile, diverse displays of South Korean politics, each of the principal political factions remain firmly in opposition to communism and are unified in their desire to maintain close ties with the United States. This position is shared by the nations citizenry. Military duty, while not relished, is seen as a necessity in the face of the threat from the north. The citizen carries a sense of duty into the military with him. South Korean participation in the Vietnam conflict demonstrated the excellent abilities of the South Korean soldiers and they have had a decade to improve.

In spite of the positive aspects, the political devisiveness does leave a chink in the South Korean armor. Internal strife is bound to turn the country away from a unified effort. In addition, alienation of any sizeable faction of the population from the government could make it extremely difficult to unify the country in a time of crisis. Whether President Chun can overcome these obstacles and lead South Korea into a

less turbulent governmental succession process, which will bring the various factions into the process, remains to be seen.

In assessing the comparison of the two Koreas on the national will issue; no clear cut advantage can be determined which would give either side a significant advantage over the other.

Geographic Factors

Comparison of the geographic element of power between South and North Korea must of necessity return to the historical significance of the peninsula as discussed in Chapter One. The Korean Peninsula has served as an invasion route both into and out of Asia. This fact combined with the ability the peninsula has to dominate adjacent waterways makes affairs on the peninsula of interest to the nations surrounding the peninsula as well as to the two Koreas.

In terms of land analysis, North Korea possesses a distinct advantage. A number of points are easily observable:

1. The North Korean capitol is further removed from the demilitarized zone and is more difficult to attack by ground. The potential for invasion of North Korean forces into the South is heightened by the presence of clear military avenues of approach into South Korea. Five major approaches exist for invasion into the South. Shown on the map from west to east these are the Kimpo Peninsula, the Western Corridor or Kaesong-Munsan Avenue, the Tongduchon-Uijongbu Corridor, the Chorwon Valley, and the East Coast Avenue of Approach. Most analysts, in an invasion

scenario, depict the principal North Korean effort being made directly down the Kaesong-Munsan-Seoul Avenue of Approach with supporting attacks on the other avenues.

POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN INVASION AVENUES OF APPROACH



1. Kimpo Peninsula Approach
2. Kaesong-Munsan Western Corridor Approach
3. Tongduchon-Uijongbu Approach
4. Chorwon Valley Approach
5. East Coast Approach

2. Lines of communications with major allies are much shorter for North Korea. The two principal allies of the North, the PRC and the USSR, are positioned on the North Korean northern border. By contrast, South Korea's major military ally, the United States, is thousands of miles removed by sea.

3. Disposition of natural resources are concentrated principally in North Korea's portion of the peninsula.

While the three mentioned points sway the land physical advantage in North Korea's favor, South Korea does possess some geographic advantages of its own. The South Korean population is 38,900,000 to 18,600,000 for the North.[22] While the fully mobilized nature of the North negates this factor somewhat, it is still an overall advantage for the South. South Korea also has an advantage in the sea areas it dominates. By its position, South Korea could dominate the southern part of the Yellow Sea, part of the southern portion of the Sea of Japan, and in particular the Korea Straits. The rub is that the military advantage in terms of naval power is with the North.

Other geographical considerations do little to favor either side. The topography is rugged and the soil generally poor throughout the peninsula. Vegatation is sparse. Some climatic advantage may accrue to the South through its more southerly location. Both nations sit adjacent to excellent fishing areas and do in fact have large fishing industries. The population growth rate is faster and the overall age of the population younger in North Korea, but this will probably not

significantly affect the overall population imbalance which is in South Korea's favor.

A concluding evaluation of geography finds this element of power weighted in favor of the North particularly in terms of a possible military conflict. The tenuous lines of communication for South Korea, coupled with the vulnerability of Seoul to an invasion, clearly are an advantage to the North if a conflict erupted.

The Overall Balance

The following table summarizes a comparison of North and South Korea based on the five elements of power and without discussing the effects of outside military intervention:

	NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA
Military Factors	Plus	Minus
Political Factors	Even	Even
Economic Factors	Minus	Plus
National Will	Even	Even
Geographic Factors	Plus	Minus
TOTAL EVALUATION	PLUS	MINUS

The analysis presented in the table as based on the discussion in this chapter leads to the conclusion that North Korea possesses overall greater power than South Korea, particularly when considering a possible near-term military conflict. However, whether that total power is sufficient to give the North the ability to exercise a military option to reunify the peninsula is certainly not defined. Without interference, considering only that each side would be resupplied by their allies,

North Korea possibly has the ability to successfully invade the South and seize Seoul at a minimum. This invasion would have a tremendous risk of failure however, and this comparison is only hypothetical considering the wide range of international repercussions that a conflict could entail. It is entirely possible that South Korea alone, in terms of military ability, might be able to present sufficient strength to deter a North Korean attack. However, as in the North Korean attack scenario discussed, the ability of the South Koreans alone to deter a North Korean attack presents substantial risk.

What has been presented then is a balance of power in which the North Koreans hold an overall advantage, but in which the South Koreans possibly have the ability to deter an attack. The result is that alone, the peninsula as it is presently divided, would present a highly volatile situation.

The Effect Of U.S. Forces

Currently the total U.S. military presence in South Korea has been reduced to approximately 38,000.[23] The following table depicts the current breakdown of U.S. military forces in South Korea:[24]

PERSONNEL	
Total Personnel	38,000
U.S. Army	28,500
U.S. Air Force	9,500
COMBAT UNITS/AIR ASSETS	
U.S. Army	1 Infantry Division with two tank battalions among

its assets.

1 Air Defense Brigade with 2 battalions containing 2 improved HAWK batteries each.

U.S. Air Force

1 Division

72 F-4E aircraft

96 F-16 aircraft

18 A-10 aircraft

18 OV10 aircraft

The following histogram depicts the change in overall force balance that the U.S. forces make to the military balance on the peninsula.[25]



As the histogram represents, even with the addition of U.S. forces in South Korea, the North Korean military still possesses significant advantages. However, analysis beyond that of mere numbers is needed.

The naval analysis shown on the chart is misleading to the extent that in the event of a conflict, the United States can be expected to provide necessary naval support to support the ROK-U.S. effort. Excluding Soviet naval interventon on behalf of the North Koreans, the U.S. would have the ability to control the seas. This would not, however, prevent North Korea from making numerous amphibious landings, using its large number of coastal patrol craft.

The air analysis shows North Korean numerical superiority, however, South Korean and U.S. aircraft are superior, and their pilots have received superior training. In addition air assets could be rapidly deployed from other Pacific areas or the United States as necessary. The conclusion is that while North Korean air assets could inflict significant damage in a surprise attack, within two to three days after the attack, ROK and U.S. air assets could achieve air superiority. The speed of friendly air superiority being achieved is dependent upon attack warning and the speed of U.S. air reinforcements arriving in South Korea. However, air superiority will be achieved. This will not preclude the North Korean air assets from achieving local air superiority for short periods of time.

The effect of U.S. forces on the ground war then becomes the critical military variable. The U.S. ground force on the peninsula does not add significantly to the numerical military strength in the South.

The added firepower in terms of armor, TOW antitank weapons, and attack helicopters makes the U.S. contribution more significant than mere numbers would indicate. In spite of this, many analysts still feel that the North Korean Army, by concentrating its forces in the attack area and achieving surprise, could still successfully invade South Korea and seize Seoul. In any case, the risk is still substantial.

The value of the U.S. ground combat elements, however, go beyond their contribution to the military balance. These forces are a signal which effects all five elements of the balance of power which have been discussed. That signal is that as long as those forces are in South Korea, the United States can be counted on to throw the full weight of its military and industrial strength to the extent necessary to stop an invasion of the South. The alternative would be to desert that division in Korea, a politically impossible decision in the U.S. The very positioning of the 2d Infantry Division virtually insures that it will be heavily involved in fighting an invasion directed at Seoul. The exact deterrent effect that this overall picture presents to the North Korean leadership cannot be calculated, but it must be extremely significant in their plans.

The overall value then of the total U.S. military force in South Korea does in fact change the total balance of power between the two Koreas. The picture changes from one in which the North Korean leadership may estimate a good chance of a successful invasion exists to one where the North Korean leaders may feel that their chances of success are not good enough to make a reunification attempt; particularly

considering the possibility of the U.S. bringing added assets into the country.

The questions posed in the hypothesis and related issues must then be addressed. What are the U. S. options? What course of action is in the best interests of the United States? Can a U.S. ground combat presence in Northeast Asia reduce the volatility of the situation? These and other questions are discussed in Chapter Four.

ENDNOTES

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982, The Military Balance 1982-1983, 1982, pp.88,89.

2. Ibid., pp.88,89.

3. Ibid., pp.88,89.

4. Ibid., pp.88,89.

5. Ibid., pp.88,89.

6. Ibid., pp.88,89.

7. G. Jacobs, "Armed Forces of the Korean Peninsula - A Comparative Study." Asian Defense Journal, November 1982, p.15.

8. International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982, The Military Balance 1982-1983, 1982, pp.88,89.

9. Ibid., pp.88,89.

10. G. Jacobs, "Armed Forces of the Korean Peninsula - A Comparative Study." Asian Defense Journal, November 1982, p.20.

11. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, The Role of U.S. Forces, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p.7.

12. U.S. Army Special Research Detachment, "North Korean Paramilitary Reserve Forces." Report Number ADC000549, January 1975, p.iii.

13. International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982, The Military Balance 1982-1983, 1982, pp.88,89.

14. U.S. Army Special Research Detachment, "North Korean Paramilitary Reserve Forces." Report number ADC000549, January 1975, pp.iii. In addition to the U.S. Army report, North Korea - A Country Study indicates that North Korean paramilitary forces may be greater than two million. Frederica M. Bunge, North Korea - A Country Study, (Foreign Area Studies, The American University, February 1981), p. 233.

15. "Korea - South, Politics and Social Affairs." Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981 Yearbook, 1981, p.177.

16. Ibid., p.177.

17. Dale Van Atta and Richard Nations, "Kim's Build-Up to Blitzkrieg." Far Eastern Economic Review, March 5, 1982, p.26.

18. "Annual Supplement - 1981." The Economist, 1981, p.41.

19. Frederica M. Bunge, North Korea - A Country Study, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-81, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. xxii.

20. Department of State Briefing Paper, "Korean Economic Outlook." February 27, 1981, pp.1,2.

21. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1970-1971, 1976-1977, 1978-1979, 1979-1980, 1982-1983.

22. International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982, The Military Balance 1982-1983, 1982, pp.88,89.

23. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress FY 1983, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982), p.C-5.

24. International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982, The Military Balance 1982-1983, 1982, pp.88,89.

25. United States Military Posture for FY 1983, prepared by The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p.43.

CHAPTER FOUR

U.S. INTERESTS AND OPTIONS

Since the early nineteenth century when the United States stretched its borders from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, the nation has had to look beyond those oceans for significant threats from foreign nations to its survival as a nation. The method chosen to meet overseas threats has varied from an isolationist policy to one of forward defense. World War II effectively put an end to any real isolationist policy. In terms of technology, world power, and commitments, the United States no longer found it possible to withdraw from international involvement. This transformation placed the country squarely in a position of needing to stake out what commitments should be made to insure the nation's survival, uphold national ideals, and aid allied nations. Prior to examining the United States' commitment to Korea, it is necessary to find out what the U.S. interests are; particularly in the Northeast Asian arena.

The principal goal or objective of the U.S. government is to insure that the nation survives and is capable of preserving the freedoms of the American people as defined in the Constitution. In the final analysis, the hypothesis of this thesis, the question of U.S. ground combat forces in Korea must be examined in the context of its contribution to that principal goal, whether directly or indirectly.

Interests are "an expression of what a state needs or wants in respect to any matter of international concerns."[1] Vital interests become those interests which directly relate to the survival of a nation. The interests which will be examined evolve from the national goals of the United States.

Unfortunately, there is no concrete list of what U.S. interests are. U.S. interests are described or discarded as international situations ebb and flow. As such, interests must be compiled from a multitude of sources, and judgements made about what interests are still valid.

The U.S. presence in South Korea has historically existed as a deterrent to North Korean attack of the South and Chinese intervention on the side of the North Koreans. By 1971, U.S. analysts considered the South Korean military strong enough to bear the principal North Korean attack and saw U.S. forces as a deterrent to Chinese intervention.[2] In 1974, in a Congressional Committee hearing, speaking on U.S. forces in Korea, "former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified that they were there less for the purpose of dealing with possible Chinese support of a North Korean attack than 'to serve as a symbol of America's continued interest in the overall stability of that part of the world during a period of some tension.'[3] Schlesinger further indicated that the U.S. force presence was primarily political in nature."[4]

President Carter's election in 1976 changed U.S. posture to the extent that he felt U.S. ground combat forces could be phased out if coupled with a corresponding upgrade of South Korean forces and increased

U.S. air support. Carter's actions reinforced the Nixon doctrine with which the United States had entered the 1970's. Nixon felt that friendly Asian states must bear a greater burden of their own self defense.[5] Carter's decision, however, was made in an environment which lacked two key elements of information; the true extent of the North Korean military buildup and a clear understanding of the advantages of a ground force presence on the Korean Peninsula in countering Soviet influence in Northeast Asia and worldwide.

In 1979, recognition of the problem began to dawn on the Carter administration, and the troop withdrawals were halted. In February 1979 the troop withdrawals were halted to allow time to study the situation. Then, on July 20, 1979, President Carter announced that the withdrawal of ground combat elements would not be resumed, that the size of the North Korean military had been underestimated, and stated that the Soviet military power in East Asia had increased significantly.[6] The incoming Reagan administration confirmed these recognitions and clearly stated its interest in East Asia.

"East Asia and the Pacific form, for the U.S., its western security region and, for the USSR, a separate theater of war with many contrasts to the military confrontation in Europe. In this large region, the interests and capabilities of four great powers converge."[7] The four powers are Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. The United States has chosen to provide for the security of the nation from a forward position in East asia.

Geographically this policy makes sense. There is little question that the Soviet Union presents the principal threat to the security of the United States. "U.S. and allied security interests are challenged today by threats of unprecedented scope and urgency. Those threats derive from the sustained growth of Soviet military power and instabilities which confront the West in several regions of the underdeveloped world."[8] The presence of a friendly nation on the Korean Peninsula could be a distinct asset to the United States in terms of an ability to monitor Soviet activities in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The Korean Peninsula dominates the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Korea Straits. When combined with domination of LaPerouse Strait by the Japanese Islands, the Soviet naval forces operating out of Vladivostok are essentially under constant observation. Further, should hostilities erupt between the United States and the Soviet Union, control of these naval chokepoints and domination of adjacent sea areas would give the U.S. a significant naval tactical advantage.

If insuring the presence of a friendly nation on the Korean Peninsula is an essential counter to the Soviet threat and therefor represents a vital interest in terms of providing for national survival should a U.S.-Soviet conflict erupt, then a case can be made for a ground combat presence on the peninsula. If the peninsula is of strategic value in the event of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, U.S. ground combat forces could not reach the peninsula nearly as fast as could Soviet forces. Prepositioned U.S. ground combat forces act as a clear sign of commitment and provide a lodgement into which other forces can be inserted. The

fact that these forces also may deter North Korean aggression and demonstrate U.S. commitment to U.S. Asian allies are added pluses. In spite of these reasons, other U.S. goals exist which affect policy in Northeast Asia.

STRATEGIC NAVAL CHOKEPOINTS



503211 8-78

Besides the principal goal of national survival, other U.S. goals in the Northeast Asian area include deterrence of conflicts that could detrimentally affect the U.S., prevent dominant influence by an unfriendly country in the Northeast Asian area, contain any conflict that should occur and secure an outcome favorable to the U.S., control sea lines of communications, and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among Asian countries.[9]

Interests which contribute to the stated goals can roughly be divided into three categories; military, political, and economic.[10] The military interests revolve around a forward defense concept which under the Nixon doctrine has evolved into a defense load sharing partnership with friendly Asian nations through a series of bilateral and some multinational treaties. The Nixon doctrine specifically stated,

> First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments...Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security...Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibilities for providing the manpower for its defense.[11]

In the context of this thesis the discussion will center on Japan and South Korea. Political interests are defined in terms of maintaining relations with U.S. Asian allies that will express the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to them and insure that they remain friendly to the United States. Economic interests stem from the fact that "Twenty-five percent of all U.S. foreign commerce involves West Pacific

countries."[12] The largest participant by far is Japan with South Korea also being an excellent trading partner.

Understanding the United States' basic goals and interests lays the foundation for examining whether a U.S. military presence, specifically a ground combat presence, in South Korea contributes to those goals and interests. The United States' military interests evolve from the desire to deter conflicts detrimental to the United States, prevent regional dominance by an unfriendly power, and contain and secure a favorable outcome in any conflict which should erupt.[13] The discussion in Chapter Three clearly showed the very delicate balance of power which exists between the two Koreas. What then are the U.S. options in South Korea concerning ground combat forces?

To answer the question, a brief look must first be taken at whether United States military forces belong in Korea at all. On this issue, based solely on U.S. national goals, justification can be found in terms of a vastly increased ability to counter the Soviet threat.

In addition, if the U.S. is to count on assistance from friendly nations, those nations must be sure that the U.S. will honor its commitments to them as well as expecting them to honor commitments to the U.S. The problem in Vietnam "caused some U.S. allies to have doubts about the reliability of the United States if they should face a military threat."[14] So it appears that justification in terms of militarily countering the Soviet threat may exist, and in addition, political justification in maintaining the confidence of U.S. allies may also be found.

U.S. economic interests are closely tied to the military and political interests. U.S. trade abounds with Japan and South Korea. Our economic ties to Japan in particular have a large effect on internal U.S. economic conditions. There is no question that affairs on the Korean Peninsula are of vital interest to Japan. Weakening of the U.S. commitment to South Korea could very well cause the Japanese to reevaluate their close ties with the United States in a manner which could negatively affect military and political interests as well as economic ones.

The final area which may justify a U.S. military presence in South Korea is based on international considerations. Specifically, do the South Koreans desire a U.S. military presence in their country? The answer to this question is completely yes! During the planning and execution of the initial ground combat withdrawals in the late 1970's, the South Korean government repeatedly pressed for a reversal of that decision by former President Carter. The South Korean government wants U.S. ground combat forces to "remain to help offset North Korean forces and to guarantee automatic U.S. involvement if the Communists should launch another attack."[15]

Given the justifications for a U.S. military presence in South Korea which exist, the question then narrows to ground combat forces and the options which exist concerning those forces. Four options concerning U.S. ground combat forces in South Korea immediately present themselves:

1. The United States could increase the number of ground combat forces present in South Korea to absolutely insure the failure of any invasion attempt.

2. The United States could maintain the current level of U.S. ground combat forces in South Korea.

3. The United States could further reduce its ground combat presence in South Korea but still maintain a token ground force as evidence of the U.S. commitment.

4. The United States could remove ground combat forces from South Korea and take other actions to insure the stability of Northeast Asia.

Each of these options will examined in the order in which they have been presented. The first option, increase of U.S. ground combat forces in Korea, is highly unlikely based on a number of factors. Defense spending is performed basically on a cost effectiveness basis. At some point, cost increases cannot reduce risk in a sufficient amount to make the cost increase worthwhile. Considering the current economic state in the United States, it is almost completely unlikely that Congress would allow deployment of additional combat forces to South Korea. Compounding the problem is the fact that the level of forces required to reduce risk to a negligible amount would be prohibitive to the United States. Any increase which could be afforded would probably not significantly alter the balance on the peninsula.

Option two possesses a number of advantages, but has one chief disadvantage. The disadvantage is that the U.S. ground combat force in South Korea serves a tripwire function. The physical positioning of this force in South Korea guanantees that it would be militarily involved if a North Korean invasion occurred. At the same time this would almost

automatically involve the United States as a nation in the conflict. Opponents of this option point to this lack of U.S. choice coupled with the expense of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea as reasons to discard this option.[16]

However, the very factor which is a disadvantage for option two is also an advantage. A U.S. military posture which insures U.S. involvement is bound to inspire confidence among U.S. Asian allies. Other advantages which could accrue from option two include the maintenance of a naval tactical advantage in Northeast Asia, the continuing existance of secure U.S. base areas in the region, and deterrence of North Korean invasion of the South.

Option three would seem to present the same advantages and disadvantages as option two on the surface. However, the key to an effective deterrence is that it must be believable. A force smaller than a division possesses two disadvantages. First, a force of smaller size could be removed from the peninsula by U.S. air assets fairly quickly. U.S. allies might sense a force reduction as a waivering of U.S. commitment and the smaller, remaining force as undependable. Second, a force smaller than a division is unlikely to be viewed by North Korea as a significant combat force should a conflict erupt.

Option four brings out the heart of the question. Why not eliminate U.S. ground combat forces completely? Proponents of this option have stated advantages that include preservation of U.S. flexibility in the event of a conflict; continued maintenance of a nuclear, air, and naval umbrella; a continued deterrence of a North

Korean attack; a reduction of tensions on the peninsula; and a reduction in defense costs to the United States.[17,18] Two key flaws exist in option four. First, acting on this option could cause U.S. allies in the Eastern Pacific to seriously reassess their policies towards the U.S., based on a perception that the U.S. commitment is unreliable. Second, adoption of option four essentially represents indecisiveness on the United States' part as to whether the Korean Peninsula and maintenance of a friendly power on that peninsula is of vital interest to the United States.

There are other options which have been proposed as courses of action for the U.S. concerning South Korea. One of these is the total disengagement from South Korea. Considering the complete lack of credibility for the U.S. that would result among U.S. Asian allies, and the resulting loss of trade, base rights, and other assets, this course of action was considered completely unfeasible and was not analyzed. Another course of action involves active proponency of the U.S. working towards a reunification of the peninsula that the PRC, USSR, Japan, and both Koreas can accept. However, the current attitude of North Korea makes this course of action currently impossible.[19]

Chapter Three concluded with the finding that U.S. forces, particularly ground combat forces, did add stability to Northeast Asia through effective deterrence of a North Korean attack. While the finding that the military force might not be large enough as currently configured to insure defeat of a North Korean attack, the presence of the U.S. force is certainly potent politically in terms of deterrence and is a clear

statement to the North Koreans of U.S. forces which would certainly be called in to support the force that is already there.

The final investigation which is necessary to address the basic hypothesis; are U.S. ground combat forces required in South Korea, from a U.S. perspective; involves meshing U.S. options and interests with the current balance of power on the peninsula to determine a solution. This discussion will take place in Chapter Five and will briefly look at the effects of the proposed solution on the USSR, the PRC, and Japan.

ENDNOTES

1. National Security Affairs, P512, Strategic Considerations and U.S. Defense Policy, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), p.22.

2. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, The Role of U.S. Forces, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p.2.

3. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations, 93:2 pt. 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp.581-583.

4. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, The Role of U.S. Forces, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), pp.2,3.

5. Richard M. Nixon, Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping A Durable Peace, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp.992,94.

6. "U.S. Troop Withdrawals From Korea." President's Statement 20 July 1979, Department of State Bulletin, September 1979, p.37.

7. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress FY83, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982), p.II-20.

8. United States Military Posture for FY 1983, Prepared by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), p.1.

9. Claude A. Buss, The United States and The Republic of Korea Background for Policy, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp.ix-xiii and Planning for Combined Operations, Northeast Asia and The Pacific, P714, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), p.6.

10. Ibid., pp.ix-xiii and p.5.

11. Richard M. Nixon, Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping A Durable Peace, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p.332.

12. Maurice F. Weisner, The U.S. Posture in Asia and the Pacific: The View from CINCPAC, pp.42-43.

13. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress FY83, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982), pp.II-20, II-21.

14. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, The Role of U.S. Forces, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p.1.

15. James N. Wallace, "Koreans to Carter: 'Yankee, Stay Here!'", U.S. News and World Report, July 2, 1979, p.22.

16. Major James V. Young, "U.S. Forces In Korea: Prerequisite for Withdrawal." Unpublished, undated article, 1977, pp.2-3.

17. Ibid., pp.2-3.

18. Nathan N. White, U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp.78-85.

19. Ibid., pp.78-85, 91-94.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The current situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to follow historical precedent. The Korean people continue to function under the shadow and influence of their more powerful neighbors. The division of Korea following World War II has served to exacerbate this situation and has introduced the United States into dealings concerning the peninsula which had formerly been reserved to China, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

Chapter One examined the history of the peninsula, domination of the peninsula by the surrounding powers, and the use of the peninsula as an invasion mechanism into or out of Asia. Chapter Two continued the historical discussion from the close of World War II. The development of a divided Korea was examined. Chapter Three specifically compared the national power of North and South Korea. Subsequently, the effect of the U.S. military presence in South Korea on that balance of power was examined. Chapter Four then laid out the U.S. interests and options concerning the peninsula and discussed the legitimacy of the U.S. presence in South Korea. However, limiting this examination to the ROK-DPRK comparison and then adding in only the effect of a U.S. presence would be incomplete.

Japan, the PRC, and the USSR all have extremely important interests in the Korean Peninsula. While it is beyond the scope of this

thesis to fully examine those interests, they are clearly part of any assessment of the need for a U.S. ground combat force presence in South Korea. The central question to this assessment is the position of each of these three powers concerning the U.S. presence, and specifically a ground combat presence, in South Korea.

The Japanese Outlook

The Japanese interest in the Korean Peninsula has both an historical and a modern base. Militarily the peninsula has served both as a Japanese invasion route into Asia and as an avenue for hostile armies to attack Japan. During World War II, the Japanese exploited the Korean people as a labor source and obtained some natural resources from the area now controlled by North Korea. Currently, the peninsula is of both a military and an economic interest to Japan.

Japan is probably the most crucial U.S. ally in East Asia. Japan is the undisputed economic leader of the entire region. Its overwhelming economic strength coupled with a professional ground self-defense force give Japan an immense latent military potential. This potential, rather than current existing military power, makes the Japanese view one which must be considered in any Northeast Asian discussion.

The Japanese view South Korea as providing a geographic buffer area, while the United States provides a nuclear umbrella and a security guarantee through the June 23, 1960, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan. Any change in these two pillars upon which the Japanese security rests would of necessity require the Japanese to reevaluate their international posture.

A Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report in December 1975 quoted an unnamed high ranking Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) civilian official as stating that "U.S. forces should remain in the Republic of Korea (ROK) as long as ROKG thinks that danger of a DPRK attack exists."[1] The source also felt that if a DPRK take-over of South Korea did occur, the Soviet Union would derive naval access advantages, Japan would face increased security problems, and a massive refugee problem would result.[2] The potential of these problems could very well result in Japanese accomodation with the PRC or the USSR should the Japanese feel that U.S. resolve to insure the sovereignty of South Korea had weakened. The result of any such accomodation by the Japanese could only be contrary to the interests of the United States.

The Japanese also have a strong economic interest in South Korea. A large amount of Japanese investment money has been put into development and industry in South Korea. In addition, South Korea provides a flourishing export market for Japanese products and technology.

The United States has increasingly called on Japan to shoulder more of its own defense burden. While internal controversy in Japan concerning the legality of the Japanese Self-Defense Force still is a topic of debate, Japanese leaders have nevertheless attempted to gradually increase their defensive capabilities, even if not to the extent desired by the United States. However, Japanese leaders would have an extremely difficult time selling the Japanese people on defense spending increases if the United States was concurrently reducing its military contribution to the collective defense of Northeast Asia. This

problem would be compounded by the current slow-down in the world-wide economy and the U.S. requests for the Japanese to limit their exports to the U.S.

The obvious conclusion is that the Japanese would view withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops in a negative light. To the Japanese, withdrawal would appear as a lessening of the U.S. commitment at the same time that the U.S. government is requesting increased military spending and economic sacrifices from the Japanese. U.S. withdrawal of ground combat troops would almost certainly cause the Japanese to examine the closeness of their relationship to the U.S., to be less responsive to U.S. desires, to broaden their international position from a totally pro-western position, and possibly to begin a process of accomodation with the communist powers in Northeast Asia. All of these results would be distinctly unfavorable to U.S. national interests.

Chinese Interests

The interests of the People's Republic of China in the Korean Peninsula predate even the Japanese interests. In the twentieth century the use of the Korean Peninsula by the Japanese to invade China is still a vivid memory of the Chinese.

North Korea serves as a buffer state for the PRC in much the same way as South Korea serves a buffer function for Japan. The proximity of North Korea to Manchuria, one of China's industrial centers, renders added importance for the Chinese to maintain a friendly government in North Korea if not in the entire peninsula. While the Chinese publically

and ideologically support the North Korean desire to unify the peninsula, the memory of severe losses in the 1950 to 1953 Korean War coupled with the current Soviet threat lead to the maintenance of peace on the peninsula as the first desire of the Chinese leadership.[3]

> China regards the United States as a superpower in competition with the USSR for world domination...The Chinese also oppose a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the Pacific area, fearing that it would invite increased Soviet intervention. The Chinese have expressed support for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and generally endorse the North Korean position, although they have advised against North Korean military action in South Korea. In essence, China hopes that U.S. power and influence will balance Soviet power and influence in the Pacific area.[4]

A further consideration is the effect of a U.S. presence in South Korea on North Korean decisions. The U.S. presence means that the North probably would have to seek either Chinese or Soviet support for a military invasion of the South. The U.S. forces, therefore, insure that the PRC will have knowledge of and some influence over any North Korean decision to invade South Korea.

The conclusion is that even while supporting the North Korean position publically, the Chinese desire that the North Korean objectives be achieved through peaceful means only. In this sense the deterrent presented by U.S. ground combat forces on the peninsula is desirable in the Chinese view, even if that view is not publically expressed by the Chinese.

Soviet Interests

Expansion by Imperial Russia at the expense of the Chinese during

the nineteenth century resulted in a short common border between Russia and Korea. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 impressed the importance of the peninsula upon the Russians. Coupled with the Russian desire for access to warm water ports, the result was the quick Soviet move to establish a friendly North Korean government at the close of World War II.

Currently, as with China, North Korea serves as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Japan. In addition, the Soviet Union recognizes the key strategic value of the Korean Peninsula concerning movement of the Soviet Navy in particular.

While unification of the entire peninsula under a government friendly to the USSR would be in the interest of the USSR, if military means were used to achieve that end, associated repercussions could outweigh the advantages of the military action. These disadvantages include creating a possible superpower confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR, causing a deterioration of relations with Japan, and increasing tensions between the USSR and China. The end result of a North Korean invasion of the South overtly backed by the USSR could be the creation of a unified front of powers to counter the Soviets including Japan, China, and the United States. This would be of far greater danger to the USSR than is the maintenance of the status-quo.

One prospect which possibly argues against a U.S. ground combat presence in Korea is if the Soviets encouraged a North Korean attack to draw off U.S. forces from other areas of the world thereby creating an opportunity for the Soviets to use their military forces in another arena such as NATO. Some have argued that the U.S. ground combat forces currently in Korea should be withdrawn and added to our strategic reserve.

The problem with removal of U.S. ground combat forces based on the argument presented is one of timely decisions and strategic mobility. Even if U.S. ground forces were withdrawn, on the event of a North Korean invasion of the South which appeared to be progressing in favor of the North, the U.S. would have to make a decision whether or not to commit troops. If U.S. troops were committed, the same problem - a possible opening for the Soviets in another part of the world, would exist. The second problem is that the United States does not have the strategic air assets to move combat forces currently in the United States in a timely manner. Former Secretary of State Brown has stated that

> ...deterrence requires locally ready forces, U.S. forces present in a troubled area, and U.S. forces that could be moved quickly into any trouble spot. According to him, the United States did not have the capability to defeat all initial enemy moves, but it did need the personnel, mobility, and firepower to preclude adversaries from reaching vital points.[5]

One of these vital points is South Korea.

The conclusion in the case of the Soviet Union is therefore much the same as that of the PRC, but for different reasons. "The USSR would appear to share with China, the United States, and Japan an interest in avoiding being drawn into war over Korea."[6] "Although the USSR openly supports the DPRK's insistance on complete withdrawal of American ground forces as a precondition for peace, like the PRC it has quietly signaled that it views the American presence in the ROK as a regional stabilizing force."[7] Therefore, while publically backing North Korean positions, the USSR should be expected to work for maintenance of the current situation or peaceful progress toward reunification on Soviet terms. Currently, to maintain regional stability, the USSR probably desires the

continued maintenance of U.S. ground combat troops in the region. Absence of a credible U.S. presence in South Korea would significantly weaken Moscow's influence over Kim Il Sung. As long as North Korea has to consider a U.S. combat presence, Kim will also have to acknowledge the possibility that he would probably need extensive assistance from either the USSR or the PRC. This gives the USSR some leverage should Kim consider a military option.

Major Power Interest Integration

For vastly different reasons, Japan, the PRC, and the USSR all currently desire a credible U.S. presence in South Korea. These three powers, along with the United States, currently share a desire to avoid a major military confrontation in the Northeast Asian region.

However, the final objectives of the major powers are in opposition. All desire to maintain the presence of a friendly Korean government on the peninsula. However, the divergent world positions of the U.S. and Japanese governments as opposed to the positions of the Soviet Union and the PRC generally result in a government which is considered friendly to the communist powers and being nonfriendly to Japan and the U.S. Although a source of continued tension, a divided Korea has in essence served the interests of the major powers since 1953 while avoiding the necessity of a major power conflict. In that regard, a credible U.S. presence in South Korea serves to promote the status quo which is currently in the interests of all the major powers.

Hypothesis Conclusions

The principal hypothesis of this thesis is that withdrawal of American ground combat forces from the Republic of Korea, under the current regional environment, would result in an unstable condition on the Korean Peninsula which would be contrary to the vital interests of the United States. To examine the validity of this hypothesis in the light of information presented in this thesis, each of the subhypotheses must be examined.

The first subhypothesis is that hostilities in Korea would undermine the overall stability of Northeast Asia and endanger the status quo in a manner detrimental to U.S. national interests. There are a number of results that hostilities in Korea could produce. The most serious and adverse outcome from the United States viewpoint is that hostilities could result in a superpower confrontation. The further danger is that a superpower confrontation could erupt into a war involving the United States, and the Soviet Union or the PRC or both. Other adverse results which hostilities in Korea could produce include an unfavorable outcome in the hostilities from the U.S. perspective, creation of regional economic turmoil with worldwide implications, and loss of a forward defense option in Northeast Asia for the U.S.

The only favorable outcome of hostilities on the peninsula for the U.S. would be if the hostilities resulted in a unified Korea under conditions favorable to the U.S. Considering the Chinese and Soviet interests which have already been outlined, this possibility is extremely remote. It is more likely, should hostilities appear to be progressing

where the existance of North Korea was threatened, that either the USSR or PRC would intervene on behalf of North Korea and that the best solution the U.S. would be able to obtain, without expansion of the conflict beyond the peninsula, would be a return to the divided Korea that currently exists.

The conclusion concerning the first subhypothesis therefore is that hostilities in Korea would be detrimental to the national interests of the United States.

The second subhypothesis is that the American presence in the Republic of Korea, of which ground combat forces are an integral part, promotes stability in Northeast Asia and serves to deter hostilities between North and South Korea. The examination of facts necessary to answer this subhypothesis is contained in Chapte. Three where the relative national power of the two Koreas is analyzed and the effect of the U.S. military presence on that balance is examined. The conclusion of Chapter Three is that the U.S. military force in South Korea is a critical part of the balance of power. The ground combat segment of that force, because of the commitment it expresses and the tripwire function it serves guaranteeing U.S. involvement in the event of hostilities, is the most important deterrent to a North Korean invasion even if it does not represent the greatest combat capability of the U.S. forces currently in South Korea. The guarantee of U.S. involvement means that the North Korean government must evaluate their capabilities against the total national power of the United States. This evaluation must lead to a conclusion to seek Soviet or PRC assistance prior to any invasion attempt

as long as U.S. military forces, particularly ground combat forces, remain. The complimentary interests of China, the USSR, and the United States to avoid a major power confrontation can then act as a restraint on the North Korean government.

The conclusion concerning the second subhypothesis is therefore that the American military presence, particularly the ground combat presence, in South Korea does deter hostilities between North and South Korea and to that extent promotes stability in Northeast Asia.

The third subhypothesis presented in the thesis is that stability or maintenance of the status quo in Northeast Asia is in the vital interests of the United States. This is perhaps the crux of the issue from a U.S. perspective. The examination of the importance of conditions in Northeast Asia is contained in Chapter Four where U.S. interests in the region are examined. The Reagan administration clarified and reaffirmed what had been part of the American defense position since the close of the Korean War when it stated that "East Asia and the Pacific form, for the U.S., its western security region..."[8] The United States, a country who chose to use the oceans to isolate itself during the nineteenth century but recognizes the technological changes of the twentieth century, has moved to a position of forward defense through a series of bilateral and collective defense agreements with allies on the far shores of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Korea and Japan anchor that strategy in Northeast Asia.

As has been discussed, Korea is important because of its geographic location. The position of the Korean Peninsula serves to

canalize Soviet naval forces moving in and out of eastern Soviet ports. This facilitates U.S. monitoring of Soviet naval movements during peacetime and would allow U.S. naval forces to hinder or perhaps stop Soviet naval movement into or out of eastern Soviet ports during a war.

The second reason for interest in the security of South Korea is the effect that failure to provide this security would have on Japan. One need only look at a map to understand why Japan's vital interests are affected by conditions on the Korean Peninsula. This source of concern for the Japanese is one which the United States must address if it expects to maintain the close strategic relationship that it has enjoyed with Japan since the close of World War II. If it is then accepted that stability or maintenance of the status quo in Northeast Asia is in the vital interests of the United States, the focus of this thesis must then be addressed: are ground combat forces essential in preserving stability and the status quo in Northeast Asia, do they reduce the potential risk of hostilities between North and South Korea, and do they serve to strengthen U.S. vital interests in countering a worldwide Soviet threat?

The presence of a ground combat force positioned north of Seoul along major potential invasion routes represents a commitment that cannot be made in any other manner. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, the ground combat forces serve a tripwire function which guarantees U.S. military involvement if a conflict should occur in Korea.

Under former President Carter's program, "withdrawal of the ground forces would decrease the likelihood of automatic American involvement if hostilities again broke out in Korea. The United States would have time

to consider its options."[9] Viewed from the perspective of existing facts, this position is simply one of indecisiveness. Korea is either vital to U.S. interests or it is not. If it is not, then troop withdrawal coupled with increased aid makes sense. In this context, the U.S. would desire that South Korea remain secure but would not be willing to fully involve the U.S. to insure that end.

However, if South Korea's security is in the vital interest of the United States, then under the existing situation on the peninsula it makes sense to have U.S. ground combat forces in position. Clearly the presence of U.S. ground combat forces lessens the risk of hostilities and places considerations and constraints on the unpredictable North Korean government which it might not otherwise face.

Finally, the importance of the peninsula in assisting the United States containment of the Soviet threat has been discussed. Recognizing that the presence of friendly powers in South Korea and Japan is critical to U.S. vital interests, in this respect, the unequivocal position that a U.S. ground combat presence in South Korea exhibits helps insure the support of U.S. allies in countering the Soviet threat as well as allowing the U.S. a forward position from which to observe and, if necessary, militarily counter the Soviet Union.

The answer to the thesis hypothesis then is that U.S. ground combat forces are essential to preserve stability and the status quo in Northeast Asia, to reduce the risk of hostilities between North and South Korea, and to serve U.S. interests in countering a worldwide Soviet threat.

Recommendations

Chapter Four examined a number of options concerning maintenance of U.S. ground combat forces in South Korea. Based on the facts presented, discussion of the issues, and the conclusion concerning the thesis hypothesis, option two becomes the recommended course of action. The United States should maintain the current level of U.S. ground combat forces in South Korea.

Adoption of this course of action, while not free of risk because of the relative small size of the current U.S. ground combat element, still provides a military ground combat force which is a credible deterrent and notifies potential aggressors that the U.S. would assist South Korea both with economic and military aid, to include participation in ground combat operations, if the ROK was invaded. A larger force, while reducing the military risk, would not be feasible economically or politically to the U.S. electorate. A smaller ground combat presence than that currently in place would not appear as a credible unequivocal American commitment to the security of South Korea and would increase the risk of hostilities to an unacceptable level.

This is true for two principal reasons. A force smaller than a division would not have the combat firepower, antiarmor capability, or logistic staying power of a division. Second, a force smaller than a division, a brigade for example, would be easier to airlift out of Korea. This fact could result in a North Korean misperception concerning U.S. resolve to assist in the defense of South Korea

There are issues beyond the scope of this thesis which will

eventually need to be addressed. The first question a critical reader of this thesis may raise concerns the length of time for which U.S. ground combat forces will be required in South Korea.

Examination of the current strategic environment reveals that the answer to the question is one of events rather than one of time. There are a number of conditions which might allow withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces. Some examples are:

1. A signed four or six power agreement between Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China concerning the status of the peninsula. Obviously North and South Korea would have to participate and/or agree to the agreement. An agreement of this type would obviously not be accomplished in a single action. The United States is in the best position to initiate diplomatic actions in this direction through its contacts with Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union.

Significant effort would probably have to be made with each of these nations just to obtain an agreement to discuss the issue. Certainly the PRC and USSR would insist all initial discussions be totally confidential to avoid undermining the currently rigid North Korean posture. The first critical hurdle would be to obtain North Korean participation in the talks, even on a confidential level. The South Korean government has already publically expressed a willingness to talk without preconditions. "On January 12, 1981, President Chun solemnly proposed an exchange of visits between the highest authorities of the North and

South."[10] This and other proposals have demonstrated at least the South's willingness to talk.

North Korea, for its part, has harshly rejected each of the South's overtures. On the few occasions over the last decade when any talks were held directly between the North and South, the visualization is that they were only made if the North perceived a potential weakness which could be exploited. This appeared to be the case with the series of meetings held between the North and South following Park's death; meetings which were immediately broken off once Chun had consolidated his power.

Whether North Korea could be brought into even confidential talks should the PRC and USSR exert pressure is questionable. There would certainly be more of an opportunity for North Korean acceptance of such a proposal in confidence after the death of Kim Il Sung.

What would be the objectives of the talks once all parties were involved? Certainly the utopian objective would be peaceful reunification of the Korean nation and withdrawal of all foreign forces. On a realistic basis, merely ending the formal state of war between the ROK and the DPRK would be a tremendous accomplishment and would greatly reduce tensions on the peninsula. Ending the formal state of war would probably be a first objective. However, merely establishing a discussion forum will reduce tensions but will be an exceedingly difficult task to accomplish.

2. A true multinational United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping

force could be set up to control the demilitarized zone while a concurrent multinational guarantee was made to insure the sovereignity of both Koreas. The current U.N. force was set up to aid the South and has no responsibility on the north side of the DMZ. This solution is in the first place only an interim solution. If implemented it could reduce tensions on the peninsula and lessen the chance of incidents along the DMZ. However, the proposal is only a partial solution at best. It would need to be tied in with meaningful discussions aimed at finding a long term solution.

The problem with this proposal is that it would be public from near the start and require United Nations General Assembly discussion. If past performance is any indication, North Korea is liable to refuse to participate based on its contention that it (North Korea) is the sole legal government on the peninsula and that the United Nations would therefore be intruding upon North Korean sovereignty. In a public forum, China and the USSR might very well be pushed into the position of backing the North Korean position.

Discussion of the problem in the United Nations would still have certain advantages. The PRC and/or the USSR could use those discussions to exert pressure on the North Koreans to agree to private talks if they (DPRK) expect the PRC and USSR to continue to publically back their position. However, return to the private negotiations envisioned in the first solution still requires

analysis of the Chinese and Soviet interests and whether those states would be interested in a departure from the status-quo toward a lessening of tensions on the peninsula. That question ties in with the third possible solution.

3. Economic and military growth by the South Korean nation could outstrip North Korean growth so that at some point there would be little risk of North Korea exercising a military option whether or not U.S. ground combat forces were present.

Based on the discussion in Chapter Three, the next decade could show significant movement in this direction. As growth both in population and economically in the South continues to outstrip the North, North Korea's military option will inexorably close. It may well be that as this probable trend occurs, the PRC and USSR will gradually see it to be in their interests to reduce tensions on the peninsula; from their eyes, perhaps with an eventual goal of a unified neutral Korea on the peninsula.

While any substantial solution may be decades away, certainly gradual growth of overwhelming power in the South could very well push the communist powers to a position of wanting a tension reduction and possibly arms limitations.

However, the rapid growth of national power in South Korea also presents an immediate danger, particularly over the next decade. North Korea, as it views the ROK's national power rapidly growing, may believe that it (North Korea) must make a military attempt for reunification now or never. This possibility highlights the need

for a credible U.S. deterrence to minimize the possibility that the unpredictable North Korean regime would attempt reunification through military force.

4. The North Korean leadership which emerges following the eventual death of Kim Il Sung could repudiate the long-standing North Korean claim of a right to exercise a military option to reunify the peninsula. Obviously the credibility of any such statement would have to be examined.

The potential solution posed here is the ultimate which could be desired from a U.S. perspective. While as a whole it is extremely unlikely, the death of Kim Il Sung will provide a critical point in time for the future of the Korean problem. New leaders, even Kim's son, mean new ideas. Even a willingness by these new leaders to agree to talks, confidential or otherwise, would still be an important step.

Again, the United States would have to be alert to seize on any chance for reduction of the tensions. New leadership in the North, combined with South Korean economic, population, and military growth would almost certainly open new possibilities towards solving the problem.

5. Reconciliation between the two Koreas through direct talks could mitigate if not eliminate the need for a U.S. ground combat force presence. Any meaningful direct discussions between the two Koreas would certainly serve to reduce tensions and direct solution of the problem to where it rightfully belongs,

in the hands of the Korean people. To date what few direct contacts have occurred between the DPRK and the ROK have been superficial and on the part of the DPRK have lacked a serious desire for accomplishment. The eventual death of Kim Il Sung, coupled with South Korean growth, could change this picture.

There are a number of initial results that direct talks could yield other than a mere reduction of tensions and these results would not threaten the government of either the DPRK or the ROK. Mail service could be established between the two Koreas. Limited visits between separated families could be permitted. Athletic team exchanges and/or initiation of a small amount of trade could be accomplished. Finally ending the formal state of war and establishing at least a forum for reunification talks would be a major achievement.

Again, accomplishment of any of these ideas must wait on a change in the current belligerent front displayed by North Korea. Some of the cited examples are much more remote than others. Obviously it is to the United States' advantage to pursue a solution to the problem through a multichanneled approach which stresses encouraging a dialogue between the two Koreas while attempting to further reduce tensions through diplomacy with Japan, the PRC, and the USSR. As stated, current prospects for reduction of regional tension will remain slim however, as long as North Korea maintains its belligerent stance concerning the existence of South Korea and its (North Korea's) right to exercise a military option for reunification.

Two factors have been discussed which may break the current impasse eventually. Kim Il Sung's advanced age certainly means that a North Korean leadership change will occur before the end of the twentieth century. In addition, the population size and economic strength advantages which the South possesses over the North will inexorably take the military option away from North Korea as a credible option. The combination of these two events must sooner or later cause North Korea to reexamine its belligerant posture toward the South. When this occurs, the U.S. must be alert to seize on the opportunity to negotiate a lasting peace in the region.

Opportunities For Further Study

This thesis was designed specifically to address the need for U.S. ground combat forces in the Republic of Korea. There are numerous questions beyond the scope of this thesis which would contribute further to understanding the situation on the peninsula.

Studies examining the Korean Peninsula from the perspective of Soviet, PRC, or Japanese security considerations would be an excellent link with this thesis. An examination and projection of the national power and relations of the two Koreas into the twenty-first century would provide a basis for future policy planning. A future projection could also provide decision point indicators for assisting in determining policy direction for the United States concerning the peninsula and for Northeast Asia.

Another examination which would have tremendous utility would be a study of the effectiveness of various North-South dialogues including the

use of other nation spokesmen through the Military Armistice Commission. A study of this type could be directed as determining options for initiating a meaningful dialogue between North and South Korea.

Finally, considering the high degree of U.S. interest in the political climate in South Korea, a study concerning the future of that country's governmental system and the politics involved should prove extremely useful for U.S. leaders both in terms of dealing with the South Koreans and for use in explaining the South Korean situation to the American electorate.

Summary

This thesis has examined the need for a United States ground combat force presence in the Republic of Korea as determined from the U.S. perspective. The historical significance of the peninsula was examined as a backdrop for the thesis. The thesis concluded that the U.S. presence, specifically the ground combat presence, did play an important role in the balance of power on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and that the U.S. presence was a significant deterrence to hostilities on the peninsula.

Examination of the interests of the major powers surrounding Korea revealed that for vastly different reasons, Japan, the USSR, and the PRC have favorable attitudes concerning a continued U.S. presence, including ground forces, in South Korea. Finally, the determination was made that it is in the vital interest of the United States to maintain a ground combat force in South Korea. That finding is based on the U.S. desire to

maintain a forward defense posture, the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. desire to contain the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia and the Pacific, and the U.S. need to demonstrate commitment to its Asian allies if reciprocal defense commitments are to be expected from those allies.

The conclusion is that U.S. ground combat forces should remain part of the U.S. commitment to South Korea, not for a specific amount of time, but until the strategic environment and power balance in Northeast Asia undergoes a significant change which would permit U.S. troop withdrawal.

ENDNOTES

1. Colonel William T. Panttaja, Army Attache, "JDA Views on Threat from Korean Peninsula." Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report, Report Number 6 852 0651 75, (Tokyo: American Embassy, December 19, 1975), p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. Major Herbert W. Nakagawa, "The Impact of a Significant Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From South Korea." Air Command and Staff College Report Number 1835-77, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Command and Staff College, May 1977), p. 41.

4. John E. Endicott and William R. Heaton, The Politics of East Asia: China, Japan, Korea, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 119, 120.

5. Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea Background for Policy, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 157.

6. Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 169.

7. Claude A. Buss, op. cit., p. 104.

8. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress FY 1983, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982), p. C-5.

9. Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea Background for Policy, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 152.

10. Ibid., p. 161.

APPENDIX A, ISS Military Balance 1982-1983, North and South Korea

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)

Population: 18,600,000.
Military service: Army, Navy 5 years: Air Force 3–4 years.
Total armed forces: 784,000.
Estimated GNP 1981: 33.6 bn won ($18.8 bn).
Estimated defence expenditure 1982: 3.2 bn won ($1.7 bn).†
$1 = 1.88 won (1982), 1.79 won (1981).

Army: 700,000.
9 corps HQ.
2 armd divs.
3 mot inf divs.
35 inf divs.
5 armd bdes.
4 inf bdes.
Special forces (100,000): 1 corps HQ: 20 bdes (incl 3 amph cdo), AB element.
2 indep tk, 5 indep inf regts.
250 arty bns.
80 rocket bns.
5 SSM bns with 54 *FROG*.

5 river crossing regts (13 bns).
300 T-34, 2,200 T-54/-55/-62, 175 Type-59 MBT; 100 PT-76, 50 Type-62 lt tks; 140 BA-64 armd cars, 1,000 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, K-3 APC; BMP-1 MICV; 4,100 76mm, M-46 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm towed, SU-76, SU-100 SP guns; 122mm, ML-20 152mm how; 11,000 82mm, 120mm and 160mm mor; 2,000 107mm, 122mm, 140mm, 200mm and 240mm MRL; 1,500 B-10 82mm RCL; 45mm, 57mm, Type-52 75mm ATK guns; AT-3 *Sagger* ATGW; 54 *FROG-5/-7* SSM; 8,000 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm towed, ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns; SA-7 SAM.

RESERVES: 260,000, 23 divs (cadre).

Navy: 33,000.
19 submarines (4 ex-Sov W-, 4 ex-Ch R-class, 11 local-built).
4 *Najin* frigates (2 may be in reserve).
18 ex-Sov FAC(M) with *Styx* SSM: 8 *Osa-I*, 10 *Komar*(.
33 large patrol craft: 3 ex-Sov (2 *Tral*, 1 *Artillerist*), 15 SO-1, 3 *Sariwan*, 6 ex-Ch *Hainan*, 6 *Taechong*.
151 FAC(G): 20 ex-Sov MO-IV(; 23 ex-Ch (15 *Shanghai* II, 8 *Shantou*(), 4 *Chodo*, 4 K-48, 64 *Chaho*(, 36 *Chong-Jin*(.
180 FAC(T): 78 ex-Sov (4 *Shershen*, 62 P-6(, 12 P-4(); 102((9 *Sinpo*, 15 *Iwon*, 6 *An Ju*, 72 *Ku Song/Sin Hung*).
30 coastal patrol craft((10 ex-Sov KM-4, 20 misc gunboats).
9 LCU, 15 LCM, 75 *Nampo* landing craft(.
Samlet coast defence msls; 2 sites.

RESERVES: 40,000.

Bases: Wonsan, Nampo.

Air Force: 51,000; some 700 combat aircraft.
3 lt bbr sqns with 70 Il-28.
13 FGA sqns: 1 with 20 Su-7; 9 with some 290 MiG-15/-17; 3 with 72 MiG-19.
12 interceptor sqns with 120 MiG-21, 120 MiG-19.
Tpts incl 180 An-2, 40 An-24, 5 Il-14, 4 Il-18, 1 Tu-154.
Hel incl 20 Mi-4, 20 Mi-8.
Trainers incl 20 Yak-11, 70 Yak-18, 100 MiG-15UTI/-19UTI/-21U, Il-28, 30 BT-6.
AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.
4 SAM bdes (12 bns, 40 btys) with 250 SA-2 in 40 sites.

KOREA: REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH)

Population: 38,900,000.
Military service: Army and Marines 30 months, Navy and Air Force 3 years.
Total armed forces: 601,600.
GNP 1981: 42,900 bn won ($63.1 bn).
Defence expenditure 1981: 2,700 bn won ($3.97 bn).
GNP growth 1981: 7.1%.
Inflation 1981: 12.6%.
$1 = 680 won (1981).

Army: 520,000.
3 Army, 6 corps HQ.
1 mech inf div (3 bdes: 3 mech inf, 3 mot, 3 tk, 1 recce bns, 1 fd arty bde).
20 inf divs (each 3 inf regts, 1 recce, 1 tk, 1 engr bn, arty gp).
3 AB divs (3 bdes: 4 AB, 1 recce, 1 hel bns, arty gp).
2 special forces bdes.
2 AA arty bdes.
2 SSM bns with 12 *Honest John*.
2 SAM bdes: 3 *HAWK*, 2 *Nike Hercules* bns.
1 army aviation bde.
1,000 M-47/-48 (incl A5) MBT; M-8 armd cars; 500 M-113/-577, 350 Fiat 6614 APC; 2,000 M-59 155mm, 12 M-107 175mm SP guns; M-101 towed, M-52 SP 105mm, M-114 towed, 76 M-109A2 SP 155mm, M-115 and 16 M-110 SP 203mm how; M-10 126mm MRL; 5,300 81mm and 107mm mor; 12 *Honest John* SSM; 80 M-18 76mm, 100 M-36 90mm SP ATK guns; *LAW* RL; 57mm, 75mm, 106mm RCL; *TOW* ATGW; 66 *Vulcan* 20mm, 40 40mm AA guns; 80 *HAWK*, 100 *Nike Hercules* SAM; 14 O-2A ac; 100 UH-1B, 100 OH-6A, 5 KH-4, 25 Hughes 500MD *Defender* hel with *TOW*; 90 *Scout*.
(On order: 37 M-109 155mm SP how; *TOW* ATGW; *Stinger*, 28 *Improved HAWK* SAM kits; 56 OH-6A, 25 Hughes 500MD hel with *TOW*).

RESERVES: 1,100,000: 23 inf divs (cadre). (Another 2.4 m have some reserve obligation.)

Navy: 49,000 incl marines.
11 ex-US destroyers: 7 *Gearing* with 8 *Harpoon* SSM (2 with 1 *Alouette III* hel), 2 *Sumner*, 2 *Fletcher*.
7 ex-US frigates: 1 *Rudderow*; 6 *Lawrence/Crosley*.
3 ex-US *Auk* corvettes.
8 FAC(M) with SSM: 6 with *Standard* (5 PSMM Mk 5, 1 ex-US *Asheville*), 2 *Kist* with 2 *Exocet*.
8 ex-US *Cape* large patrol craft.
28 coastal patrol craft: 6 CPIC FAC(P); 13 Sewart (9 65-ft, 4 40-ft), 9 *Schoolboy* I/II.
8 MSC-268/-294 coastal minesweepers, 1 minesweeping boat.
28 ex-US landing ships (8 LST, 10 LSM, 10 LCU).
(On order: 1 sub, 1 frigate, 20 FAC(M), 75 *Harpoon* SSM.)

Bases: Chinhae, Cheju, Inchon, Mokpo, Pukpyong, Pohang, Pusan.

RESERVES: 25,000.

MARINES: (24,000).
2 divs, 1 bde; LVTP-7 APC.

RESERVES: 60,000.

Air Force: 32,600, some 434 combat ac, 10 armed hel.
7 combat, 2 tpt wings.
18 FGA sqns: 14 with 250 F-5A/B/E; 4 with 70 F-86F.
3 AD sqns with 60 F-4D/E.
1 COIN sqn with 24 OV-10G, some A-37.
1 recce sqn with 10 RF-5A.
2 ASW sqns: 1 with 20 S-2A/F ac; 1 with 10 Hughes 500MD hel.
1 SAR hel sqn with 6 UH-19, 20 UH-1B/H.
5 tpt sqns with 10 C-54, 20 C-123J/K, 2 HS-748, 6 C-130H, Aero *Commander*
Trainers incl: 20 T-28D, 40 T-33A, 14 T-37C, 20 T-41D, 35 F-5B, 61 F-5F.
AAM: *Sidewinder*, *Sparrow*.
(On order: 30 F-16A, 6 F-16B, 36 F-5E, 32 F-5F fighters; AIM-9Q *Sidewinder* AAM; *Maverick* ASM.)

RESERVES: 55,000.

Para-Military Forces: Homeland Reserve Defence Force, 3,300,000; Civilian Defence Corps, 4,400,000; Student Homeland Defence Corps, 1,820,000. Coastguard: 25 small craft, 9 Hughes 500D hel.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Acheson, Dean. The Korean War. New York, N.Y.:W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 1971.

2. Barnds, William J. ed. The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs. New York, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1976.

3. Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot, A Military Political History. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.

4. Buss, Claude A. The United States and the Republic of Korea Background for Policy. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

5. Choy, Bong-Youn. Korea, A History. Rutland, Vermont: Chalres E. Tuttle Company, Inc., 1971.

6. Clough, Ralph N. Deterrence and Defense in Korea, The Role of U.S. Forces. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976.

7. Clough, Ralph N. East Asia and U.S. Security. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.

8. Cummings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.

9. Deibel, Terry L. Commitment in American Foreign Policy, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 80-4, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Research Directorate, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1980.

10. Endicott, John E. and Heaton, William R. The Politics of East Asia: China, Japan, Korea. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.

11. Han, Woo-Keum. The History of Korea. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press, 1970, Second Printing 1971.

12. Henthorn, William E. A History of Korea. New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, Division of MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1971.

13. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 1981-1982. London, England: Spottiswoode Ballantyne LTD., Colchester, Spring 1982.

14. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1982-1983. London, England: Spottiswoode Ballantyne LTD., Colchester, 1982.

15. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1970-1971. London, England: Spottiswoode Ballantyne LTD., Colchester, 1970.

16. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1976-1977. London, England: Spottiswoode Ballantyne LTD., Colchester, 1976.

17. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1978-1979. London, England: Spottiswoode Ballantyne LTD., Colchester, 1978.

18. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1979-1980. London, England: Spottiswoode Ballantyne LTD., Colchester, 1979.

19. Jordan, Amos A. and Taylor, William J. Jr. American National Security, Policy and Process. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981.

20. Korean Overseas Information Service Ministry of Culture and Information. A Handbook of Korea. Seoul, Korea: Samhwa Printing Co., LTD., Third Edition, December 1979.

21. Nixon, Richard M. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

22. Scalapino, Robert A. The United States & Korea, Looking Ahead, The Washington Papers, Volume VII No. 69. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979.

23. Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. New York, N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967.

24. White, Nathan N. U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.

Government Documents

1. Background Notes, Republic of Korea. Department of State, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 28, 1981, pp. 2-9.

2. Bunge, Fredericka M. ed. North Korea, A Country Study. Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-81, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, First Printing.

3. Callaway, Jack G., Colonel, USA. Korea: Future Problems, Future Policies. National Security Affairs Monograph 77-3, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Research Directorate, February 1977.

4. Defense Bulletin. Defense of Japan, White Paper on Defense (Summary). Tokyo, Defense Agency, Japan: Volume V, Number 1, October 1981.

5. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress FY83, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 1982.

6. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations. 93:2 pt. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 581-583.

7. Department of State Briefing Paper. Korean Economic Outlook. February 27, 1981, pp. 1-2.

8. "East Asia: U.S. Combat Forces in South Korea." Statement by President Carter 21 April 1978, Text from Weekly Compilation of April 24. Department of State Bulletin, June 1978, p. 36.

9. Fifth Pacific Armies Management Seminar, Final Report. Manila, Republic of Phillipines, 16-20 November 1981.

10. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, Korea. Prepared by the American Embassy, Seoul, FET 82-022, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, March 1981, pp. 2-13.

11. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, Korea. Prepared by the American Embassy, Seoul, FET 82-022, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, March 1982, pp. 7-8.

12. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, Korea. Prepared by the American Embassy, Seoul, FET 82-052, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, July 1982, pp. 1-11.

13. National Security Affairs, P512 Strategic Considerations and U.S. Defense Policy. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982.

14. North Korean Paramilitary Reserve Forces. U.S. Army Special Research Detachment, Report Number ADC000549, Fort Meade, Maryland, January 1975.

15. Planning for Combined Operations, Northeast Asia and the Pacific, P714. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, November 1982.

16. Panttaja, William T., Colonel, USA, Army Attache. Japan Defense Agency Views on Threat from Korean Peninsula. Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report, Report Number 6-852-0651-75, USDAO Tokyo, December 19, 1975.

17. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Speech to the National Press Club, Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, p. 111.

18. Text of Secretary Haig's Remarks on ABC's Issues and Answers as interviewed by Frank Reynolds 19 July 1981. Department of State Bulletin, October 1981, pp. 19-20.

19. "U.S. Troop Withdrawals From Korea", President's Statement 20 July 1979. Department of State Bulletin, September 1979, p. 37.

20. United States Military Posture for FY 1983, The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washingto, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

21. Vreeland, Nena; Just, Peter; Martindale, Kenneth; Moeller, Robert; Rinn, Sup-Shinn. South Korea, A Country Study. Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-41, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, Second Edition, Third Printing.

22. Vreeland, Nena; Rinn, Sup-Shinn; Just, Peter; Moeller, Robert. Area Handbook for North Korea. Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-81, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1976, First Printing.

Periodicals and Newspapers

1. "A Shoot Out In Seoul." Newsweek, 5 November 1979, pp. 60-62.

2. "Annual Supplement 1981." The Economist, 1981, pp. 39-45.

3. Atta, Dale van and Nations, Richard. "Kim's Build-Up To Blitzkrieg." Far Eastern Economic Review, March 5, 1982, pp. 25-28.

4. Brown, Thomas L., Major. "The North Korean Threat Today: A Reassessment." Joint Perspectives, pp. 52-61.

5. Carpenter, William M. "The Korean War: A Strategic Perspective Thirty Years Later." Comparative Strategy, Volume 2, Number 4, 1980, pp. 335-353.

6. Carpenter, William M.; Young, C. Kim; and Dolvin, W.G. "The Maintenance of U.S. Forces In Korea." Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center, SRI Project 3115, June 1975.

7. Carpenter, William M.; Young, C. Kim. "The Maintenance of U.S. Forces In Korea - Executive Summary." Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center, SRI Project 3115, June 1975.

8. "Carter's Koreanization Plan." The New Republic, 11 June 1977, pp., 5-6.

9. Chapman, William (The Washington Post) "U.S. Losing Ability to Influence South Korea." Kansas City Times, August 28, 1980.

10. Cotter, Donald R. and Wikner, N.F. "Korea: Force Imbalances and Remedies." Strategic Review, Spring 1982, pp. 63-70.

11. "Dissidents still barred from Korean politics." The Kansas City Times, February 26, 1983, p. E-6.

12. Harrison, Selig S. "China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?" A study from The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, June 29, 1978, pp. 1-9.

13. Hinton, Harold C; Poole, Peter A.; Young, Kim C.; Zwhlke, Arthur A. Jr. "The Maintenance of U.S. Forces in Korea: Background Study." Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center, SRI Project 3115, June 1975.

14. "In Korea, War Goes On-Underground." U.S. News & World Report, November 6, 1978, p. 36.

15. Jacobs, G. "Armed Forces of the Korean Peninsula - A Comparative Study." Asian Defense Journal, November 1982, pp. 12-31.

16. "Japan increases military spending in an effort to satisfy U.S. requests." The Associated Press, The Kansas City Times, December 30, 1982, p. A-11.

17. "Japanese leader predicts more military spending." The Washington Post, The Kansas City Times, January 1, 1983, p. A-9.

18. Judd, Peter. "ROK Pauses, and Prepares to Move Ahead." Strategy Week, August 4-10, 1980, pp. 8-9.

19. Keatley, Robert. "The Medium Term Threat to South Korea's Stability." The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1982, p. 25.

20. Kihl, Young Whan. "North Korea: A Reevaluation." Current History, April 1982, pp. 155-159, 180-182.

21. "Korea In Context, A Primer on the Dynamics of Northeast Asia." A special report, Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C.: July 1977, pp. 3-4.

22. "Korea-South, Politics and Social Affairs." Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981 Yearbook, 1981, pp. 174-180.

23. "Korean Dissident in Hospital." Associated Press, The Kansas City Star, December 16, 1982, p. 11A.

24. "Koreans to Carter: 'Yankee, Stay Here!'" U.S. News & World Report, 2 July 1979, p. 22.

25. Lehner, Urban C. "Firms Hesitate to Invest in Korea." Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1981, p. 27.

26. Lewis, John. "Reprieve for Kim puts the Japanese at ease." Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 1981, p. 24.

27. "Major goals set for Schultz in Far East." The Associated Press, The Kansas City Star, January 30, 1983, p. 4-A.

28. "North Korea's leader may pass reins to son." The Associated Press, The Kansas City Star, April 26, 1983, p. 5-C.

29. "Rise of a Strongman." Time, 8 September 1980, p. 36.

30. Sennewald, Robert W., General. "Partners in Arms, Century-Old Friends." Army 1982-1983 Green Book, Arlington, Virginia: Association of the United States Army, October 1982, pp. 82-91.

31. Sexton, William. "Closing doors to trade jeopardizes America's Asian allies." The Kansas City Times, January 6, 1983, p. F-9.

32. Shin, Jae Hoon. "After the gloom, a new deal from Chun." Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 1981, pp. 18-20, 22-23.

33. Shinn, Rin-Sup. "North Korea in 1981: First Year For DeFacto Successor Kim Jong Il." Asian Survey, January 1982, pp. 99-105.

34. "South Korea '82." Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1982, pp. 45, 47-52, 54-58, 67-78.

35. "South Korea After Park." Newsweek, 12 November 1979, pp. 55-61.

36. Tharp, Mike. "Buying Time for Change." Far Eastern Economic Review, November 12-18, 1982, p. 42.

37. Tharp, Mike. "Does Washington want Japan to start exporting weapons?" The Kansas City Times, January 5, 1983, p. A-11.

38. Tharp, Mike. "North Korea - The Camouflaged State." Far Eastern Economic Review, March 5, 1982, p. 28.

39. "The President Talks Tough." U.S. News & World Report, 6 June 1977, p. 19.

40. "Why Carter's Withdrawal Plan Draws Fire." U.S. News & World Report, June 6, 1977, p. 18.

41. Wickham, John A. Jr., General. "The Challenge of Maintaining Peace." 1981 Army Green Book, October 1980, pp. 82-88.

Unpublished Material

1. Ecoppi, Joseph L. LTC. "The Nixon Doctrine, Impact on the Republic of Korea." A Student Paper Written for the Communicative Arts Program, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1971.

2. Harris, Clifton S. "Tripwire Strategy: An Analysis of U.S. Forces Committed to West Germany and Korea." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College Essay, October 23, 1974.

3. Hulsey, Lieutenant Commander William Jaime. Japan and North Korea: The Growing Accomodation Between Japan and North Korea and its Effect on the National Security of the United States. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Masters Thesis, March 1978.

4. Kennedy, William V. "The Future of U.S. Military Commitments to Japan and Korea." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 25, 1976.

5. Meeko, Major Joseph G. IV. "The Impact of the Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From Korea Upon Japanese Defense Policy." Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1977.

6. Nakagawa, Major Herbert W. "The Impact of a Significant Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From South Korea." Report Number 1835-77, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1977.

7. Olds, Bowman M. How Will the United States Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea Affect Japan's National Security. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Unpublished MMAS Thesis, 1979.

8. Peterson, LTC Donald H. "Korea: Changing Sphere of Influence." Report Number 5386, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, Air University, April 1974.

9. Seals, LTC Billy R. "Evolution of Military Manpower Policy: The Korean War." Professional Study Number 5573, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, Air University, April 1975.

10. Shin, Il-Soon. Self-Defense of the Republic of Korea in the 1990's. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Unpublished MMAS Thesis, 1981.

11. Simpson, James M. Wartime Interoperability Problems Posed by Differences in South Korean and United States Army Tactics. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Unpublished MMAS Thesis, 1980.

12. Smartt, Richard W. The Nixon Doctrine and the Balance of Power. Air War College Professional Study Number 5073, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, Air University, April 1973.

13. Vander Meer, COL Richard G. "The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Korea." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College Essay, October 21, 1974.

14. Weinland, Robert G. "The U.S. Navy in the Pacific: Past, Present, and Glimpses of the Future." Alexandria, Virginia: Professional Paper 264, Institute of Naval Studies, Center for Naval Analysis, November 1979.

15. Young, Major James V. "U.S. Forces in Korea: Prerequisites for Withdrawal." Unpublished, undated article, prepared 1977, 13 pages.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3. CPT Jonathan M. House, Ph.D.
   Combat Studies Institute
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

4. LTC James F. Hufstetler
   Department of Joint and Combined Operations
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

5. LTC James V. Young
   Department of Joint and Combined Operations
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027